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INTRODUCTION

Most contract cases arise from disputes about the interpretation of the
contracts.2 Even contracts that are carefully drafted by experienced and
sophisticated parties can have ambiguous contract terms, and that creates
the potential for disputes about the appropriate interpretation of the parties’
contractual rights and obligations. Most of the law and economics literature
on matters of contract interpretation focuses on the kind of evidence a court
should consider in interpreting a contract; in particular, whether it should
adopt a textualist approach and rely exclusively on the express terms of the
parties’ agreement, or whether it should adopt a contextualist approach and
interpret the terms of the contract using evidence about the context in which
they were drafted.3 Ironically, the law and economics literature does not
address whether and how the contract term that is usually of most interest to
economists—the contract price—might be used to interpret other ambiguous contract terms.4 This is no doubt because there are legal authorities that
caution against evaluating the adequacy of consideration in deciding contractual disputes.5 But while these authorities are compelling for many contracts, the underlying logic is not particularly persuasive for others. Indeed,
the authorities have not prevented some courts from evaluating the contract
price in interpreting some contracts.6 Unfortunately, to the extent that courts
have evaluated the contract price in resolving interpretive disputes, they
have done so without any guidance from economic theory.
There are both theoretical and doctrinal justifications for the taboo
against using the contract price to interpret other contract terms. The
strongest theoretical justification draws on economic theory. Conventional
economic theory assumes that the buyers in consumer contracts make their
decisions in accordance with the non-quantifiable psychological values they

2.
George Cohen, Interpretation and Implied Terms in Contract Law, in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 125, 125-26 (Gerrit de Geest ed., 2d ed. 2011).
3.
Id. at 130-31.
4.
See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 108-11 (5th ed.
1998) (acknowledging with approval that courts do not normally inquire into the adequacy
of consideration); JEFFREY L. HARRISON, LAW AND ECONOMICS IN A NUTSHELL 124 (5th ed.
2011) (acknowledging that contract law reflects some ambivalence about consideration, and
attributes this to tensions between its competing goals); ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN,
LAW & ECONOMICS 198 (5th ed. 2007) (discussing bargain theory without acknowledging
any role that consideration might play in interpreting bargains); THOMAS J. MICELI, THE
ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW 92 (2d ed. 2009) (implicitly addressing the peppercorn theory,
but accepts the view that people are the best judges of their own interests).
5.
See infra Part II.D-E.
6.
See infra Part II.D-E
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attach to goods and services.7 Since courts cannot reliably assess the
strength of consumers’ psychological preferences, this precludes the possibility that they might reasonably be able to evaluate whether the contract
price was adequate for whatever right a consumer buyer might claim under
an ambiguous contract term.8 The doctrinal justification derives from legal
precedents established in cases in which courts rejected common law arguments rooted in principles of equity that the consideration paid was too high
or too low for the consideration received.9 These legal precedents reflect the
adequacy of consideration doctrine—or the peppercorn theory, as it is often
called—which precludes courts from evaluating the adequacy of consideration in deciding whether to enforce a contract or clauses of a contract.10 The
modern rationale for the peppercorn theory rests heavily on the conventional economic logic, although the doctrine actually preceded the development
of modern economic theory.
The theoretical and doctrinal reasons not to evaluate the adequacy of
consideration in interpreting other contract terms are particularly persuasive
in consumer contracts and many common law contracts for services and
real property in which the parties’ valuations may be more psychological in
nature than pecuniary, and the nature of their consideration may be complex. They are not particularly compelling, however, in commercial contracts between merchants, and they are largely, if not entirely, irrelevant in
contracts for the sale of goods between sophisticated business parties.11 In
contracts for the sale of goods between sophisticated business parties, the
buyers’ consideration is almost always merely the contract price.12 It can
7.
The conventional economic theory of consumer behavior assumes that consumers have ordinal preferences and uses the concept of a utility function to reflect a consumer’s
preference ordering without in any way implying that the utility the consumer derives from
the consumption of the goods can be measured. See, e.g., JAMES M. HENDERSON & RICHARD
E. QUANDT, MICROECONOMIC THEORY: A MATHEMATICAL APPROACH 7 (3d ed. 1980) (“The
consumer possesses an ordinal utility measure . . . [H]is ranking of commodities is expressed
mathematically by his utility function . . . but these numbers provide only a ranking or ordering of preferences.”). For a standard graduate-level treatment of consumer preference theory, see ANDREW MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY 6-9 (1995).
8.
This is the issue emphasized in the law and economics texts. See, e.g., POSNER,
supra note 4, at 111.
9.
See infra Part II.C.
10.
For a discussion of the peppercorn theory, see Edmund Polubinski Jr., The Peppercorn Theory and the Restatement of Contracts, 10 WM. & MARY L. REV. 201 (1968).
11.
Merchants are usually presumed to have some threshold level of business acumen. Nonetheless, there is an important difference between a sole proprietor and a large,
multinational corporation. The term “sophisticated business parties” is intended to exclude
from the set of all merchants those who are not sufficiently rational to comport with the
fundamental postulates of rational business behavior.
12.
Article 2 of the U.C.C. defines a sale as the “passing of title from the seller to
the buyer for a price.” U.C.C. § 2-106(1) (1977) (amended 2003).
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thus be easily quantified in dollars and cents. Moreover, since business parties typically seek to maximize their profits, they do not attach any particular psychological value to the goods they buy or sell through their commercial contracts. In contrast to consumer buyers or sellers, their preferences
are simple: they prefer more profits to less and their profits can be quantified in dollars and cents too. This undermines the economic rationale for
the peppercorn doctrine and argues against applying it in at least some cases. Indeed, from an economic perspective, it might be socially inefficient
for courts not to use the contract price to help in interpreting disputed contract terms if the use of the contract price could improve their decisions.13
The argument obviously flies in the face of considerable distinguished
commentary to the contrary.14 But to claim that courts cannot evaluate the
adequacy of the contract price in a commercial case between sophisticated
business parties flies in the face of the fact that courts routinely make
judgments in cases that require the application and evaluation of relatively
sophisticated economic theory and econometric evidence.15 Moreover, it
ignores the fact that the burden lies on the parties to adduce the arguments
and evidence necessary to support their interpretations of the contract, not
the courts. It may also underestimate the courts’ capabilities: judges today
are probably more knowledgeable in general about economics than they
have ever been;16 they have exceptionally talented clerks and interns who
13.
The “rational expectations” school of macroeconomics has been largely discredited, but one of its lasting contributions was to elucidate the implications of rationality assumptions for the use of information in formulating expectations. One of its basic postulates
was that a rational actor should make use of all relevant and costless information in formulating expectations about the future. A corollary to this is the idea that a rational actor should
use all relevant and costless information in making decisions. If the contract price is clearly
specified and provides information that would be helpful in interpreting other contract terms,
a judge who failed to use it would be less than fully rational and might make socially inefficient decisions. See STEVEN M. SHEFFRIN, RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS (2d ed. 1996), for a
well-known survey of the “rational expectations” literature. Although the “rational expectations” school of macroeconomics has fallen into disfavor, the basic idea that rational actors
should use all freely available information in forming their expectations and making decisions is still valid.
14.
See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 4, at 111. As Robert Hillman has observed, many
mainstream scholars subscribe to what he calls the theory of the “subjectivity of value,” by
which he appears to mean that only parties themselves can know their valuations of things.
ROBERT A. HILLMAN, THE RICHNESS OF CONTRACT LAW 184 (1997). This theory is much
more compelling when parties’ valuations are in some part psychological in nature rather
than entirely pecuniary and seems ill-suited to contracts between business parties.
15.
In contracts cases, for instance, courts frequently calculate expectation damages
or lost profits, and in antitrust cases, they frequently evaluate economic theories and evidence about anticompetitive conduct.
16.
The Law and Economics Center at George Mason University School of Law,
for instance, has been offering instruction in economics to federal and state judges for over
thirty-five years. Mason Judicial Education Program, GEO. MASON U. SCH. L., L. & ECON.
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have generally had at least some—and often significant—exposure to economic reasoning,17 and they have better access to a wide range of easily
accessible academic resources through the internet and online databanks of
scholarly articles, monographs, and case law than at any time in history.
Finally, the claim that courts cannot evaluate the adequacy of consideration
does not negate the fact that they already do and are likely to continue doing so.18 If courts are going to evaluate the adequacy of contract prices anyway, it would clearly be best if they had some guidance from economic
theory.
A.

EXAMPLES

Consider an example.19 Suppose that the parties to a sales contract
have a dispute about a term stated in an attachment to the writing that
serves as the main evidentiary basis for their contract. Suppose that the term
appears to guarantee the performance of the goods and that the main writing
states that the attachments are incorporated into the contract, but that the
writing was drafted by the buyer and it is not clear that the seller assented to
the guarantee. Suppose, in addition, that under the prevailing trade usage
such a warranty term would not normally be relegated to an attachment to
the main writing. Under a purely textual interpretation, the contract would
normally include the guarantee. Under a contextual interpretation of the
contract, however, the term purporting to make the guarantee is ambiguous.
The placement of the guarantee in the attachment to the main writing, the
seller’s denial of assent, and the prevailing trade usage raise questions about
whether it was an intended part of the parties’ bargain.
Similar interpretive problems can arise even without any extrinsic evidence to suggest ambiguities in the text. Consider a contract for the sale of
goods in which there is an exclusive limited remedy clause as well as a
clause disclaiming consequential damages.20 Suppose a court concludes that
the limited remedy failed of its essential purpose. Article 2 of the U.C.C.
states that if a limited remedy fails of its essential purpose the buyer should
then have recourse to all the remedies that would otherwise have been
available under the U.C.C. These remedies would normally include conseCENTER, http://www.masonlec.org/programs/mason-judicial-education-program (last visited
July 12, 2012).
17.
Many law students studied economics prior to attending law school; even if they
did not, law and economics is offered as a course at many law schools, and the law and
economics perspective is typically presented in most of the first year law courses, especially
in contracts, property, and torts.
18.
See infra Part IV.
19.
The example is based on the case discussed infra Part IV.A.
20.
See infra Part IV.C.
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quential damages, but if the contract also includes a disclaimer of consequential damages, does the disclaimer trump any claims for consequential
damages, or is the disclaimer void because the limited remedy has failed of
its essential purpose and the U.C.C. states that the buyer is thus entitled to
all the remedies otherwise available? This question has dogged courts for
some time.21 One could argue that under a strict interpretation of the text,
the disclaimer should apply, since it would serve no purpose at all if it did
not apply when the limited remedy failed. Nonetheless, some courts have
declined to take such a literal approach and have instead decided the matter
by attempting to interpret the parties’ intentions.22
Faced with the task of deciding whether a disputed term, such as the
performance guarantee or the right to consequential damages in these examples, was part of the parties’ bargain, the first thing an economist might
want to ask is, did the buyer pay for it? In other words, was the contract
price high enough for the contract to include a performance guarantee or the
right to consequential damages if a limited remedy failed its essential purpose? That seems like a perfectly reasonable, common sense question, but
to answer it properly a court would have to evaluate the adequacy of the
contract price, and that would contravene the peppercorn theory. This has
no doubt impeded many courts from even asking the question, let alone
attempting to answer it. But since the logic of the peppercorn theory is
compelling primarily when the parties have non-quantifiable psychological
preferences or the nature of the consideration is complex, courts might be
remiss in at least some cases not to use information about the contract price
to help decide whether a disputed term was an intended part of the parties’
bargains.23
To mitigate, if not completely forestall, any theoretical objections to
the analysis, this Article focuses on contracts for the sale of goods between
sophisticated business parties.24 It accepts the bargain theory as the primary
normative compass for modern commercial contracts.25 The basic premise,
however, is that the contract doctrines that circumscribe and define the consideration requirement, such as the peppercorn theory and the doctrines of
21.
Id.
22.
Id.
23.
See supra note 13.
24.
Thus, it does not purport to address common law contracts or consumer contracts. At the same time, nothing in the analysis necessarily restricts the conclusions or recommendations to contracts for the sale of goods between sophisticated business parties.
Whether the conclusions or recommendations might gainfully be applied to other contracts is
a question best left open for further contemplation and discourse.
25.
The leading alternative to the bargain theory is a promise-based approach. See,
e.g., CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE (1981). The promise-based approach has a
strong moral appeal, but it is not the central doctrinal tenet of modern contract law. See id. at
37.
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nominal consideration and unconscionability, provide an incoherent framework for addressing many modern problems in contract interpretation and
an inadequate basis for arbitrating at least some modern contractual disputes.26 There is, for instance, little practical difference between a court
holding, as a matter of public policy, that a particular contract clause was
void at the time the contract was formed because the seller used deceptive
or misleading bargaining tactics and the clause is so unfair or one-sided it
shocks the conscience and a court holding, as a matter of contract interpretation, that the contract does not include that particular clause because the
consideration was inadequate for it to have been part of the bargain. Yet the
doctrine of unconscionability provides authority for the former holding and
the peppercorn doctrine precludes the latter.
The matter is especially confounding because, as Robert Hillman has
pointed out, an overreaching interpretation of a contract often works handin-hand with guile and deception at the negotiation stage of the contracting
process.27 There is thus a fine line between regulating contracts and interpreting them. If the doctrine of unconscionability does not apply, perhaps
because there is insufficient evidence of guile and deception during the
negotiations to find any procedural abuse, the peppercorn doctrine could
preclude a court from considering relevant information in deciding whether
an interpretation of the contract is overreaching. Unfortunately, therefore, a
prohibition against evaluating the adequacy of consideration in contexts
where it could aid in the interpretation of a contract increases the likelihood
of erroneous judicial decisions and injects uncertainty into commercial
transactions. If courts evaluate the contract price sensibly, and they only
draw reasonable inferences where such are possible, their decisions will
only be better, not worse.
B.

THESIS

The central argument of this Article is that some relatively simple economic analysis may not only help to untangle some of the knots in modern
contract doctrine and theory, but may also help to bring the theory of commercial contracts into closer alignment with modern sales codes, such as the
U.C.C. and United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods (CISG), as well as some of the modern cases.28 Indeed, the
26.
This approach is consistent with Robert Hillman’s admonishment to eschew
attempts to offer overarching theories of contract and focus instead on investigating the
implications of contract doctrines. See HILLMAN, supra note 14, at 41.
27.
Id. at 146-52.
28.
As the discussion, infra Part IV, elaborates, the official comments to Article 2 of
the U.C.C. actually encourage courts to look to the adequacy of the contract price, at least in
some cases. Moreover, some courts have heeded the advice and considered the adequacy of
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tangled knots in modern contract theory probably resulted from the way
contract doctrines evolved rather than any underlying logic. Modern contract law and all of the doctrines that circumscribe and define the modern
consideration requirement began to evolve in the late nineteenth century.29
This was largely before the seminal developments in economic theory that
gave rise to the prevailing neoclassical economic paradigm were able to
congeal.30 If modern economic theory had developed prior to the important
doctrinal developments in contract law, and if it had influenced those developments as much as economic theory has subsequently influenced the
development of legal doctrines, the bargain theory of contracts today would
probably be more clearly rooted in an economic conception of bargains.
This certainly would not have precluded controversy about the role of bargain theory in modern contract law, but bargain theory itself probably
would have been more doctrinally coherent.
As the discussion below elaborates, courts in some sales cases have, in
fact, appealed to contract prices in resolving some contractual disputes,
although they may not always have done so with as much guidance as they
could have used.31 Obviously, if courts are going to evaluate the adequacy
of contract prices in resolving contractual disputes, they should do so in a
manner that comports with sound principles of economics and a coherent
economic theory of commercial bargains. Since the literature on law and
economics offers no guidelines, this Article attempts to fill the gap. To that
end, it develops a general economic analysis of contractual bargains and
uses it to suggest some basic and intuitively compelling ways in which contract prices may aid in the interpretation of ambiguous contract terms. As it
turns out, the economic analysis also implies some important limitations on
the usefulness of contract prices in interpreting ambiguous contract terms,
even in contracts for the sale of goods between sophisticated business parthe contract price in interpreting disputed contract terms. The CISG does not expressly authorize courts to consider the adequacy of the contract price, but it does not embrace the
consideration requirement either, and its focus on parties’ intended bargains is compatible
with the approach in this Article.
29.
According to Roy Kreitner, “our current understanding of the [consideration]
doctrine acquired its framework from the massive theorization and reformulation of the
doctrine pursued by late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century legal scholars.” ROY
KREITNER, CALCULATING PROMISES 16 (2007).
30.
The neoclassical school of economic thought did not mature into a major intellectual force in the U.S. until John Bates Clark published his now-classic monograph, The
Distribution of Wealth: A Theory of Wages, Interest, and Profit in 1899. Prior to then, the
institutionalist school, spearheaded by economists such as Thorsten Veblen and J.R. Commons, dominated the American economics profession. See Joseph Persky, The Neoclassical
Advent: American Economics at the Dawn of the 20th Century, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 95, 96
(2000). Thus, the reformulation of contract doctrine that Kreitner refers to occurred prior to
the ascendancy of neoclassical economics. KREITNER, supra note 29, at 16.
31.
See infra Part IV.
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ties. This Article, therefore, not only suggests some ways in which contract
prices can be used to improve the reliability of contractual interpretations,
but also offers some admonishments against using contract prices in ways
that might diminish the reliability of contractual interpretations.
Part II of this Article revisits the reformulation of the consideration
doctrine around the turn of the twentieth century, with a view to understanding why the taboo against evaluating the adequacy of consideration
evolved. Part III offers an economic analysis of bargains and uses it to suggest how the contract price in a contract for the sale of goods might be used
to interpret ambiguous terms in the contract. Part IV discusses and critiques
some of the cases in which courts have, in fact, evaluated the adequacy of
the contract price in resolving interpretive ambiguities and suggests other
cases and circumstances in which they should have done so. Part V offers
some conclusions.
II.

AN EXEGESIS OF CONSIDERATION DOCTRINE

The contours of modern contract law were forged in response to social
and economic changes wrought by the expansion of commercial markets
and an increase in commercial activities that began in the late nineteenth
century.32 In the face of the new commercial realities, courts and legal
scholars reinterpreted and reformulated the doctrine of consideration, laying
the groundwork for the bargain theory of contract.33 Under the dominant
conception of consideration prior to the twentieth century, consideration
entailed any benefit to the promisor or detriment to the promisee, regardless
of whether there was reciprocal inducement.34 Late nineteenth and early
twentieth century scholars, however, reinterpreted consideration to require
“reciprocal . . . inducement . . . between consideration and promise,”35 thus
limiting the enforcement of promises to those made as part of a bargain.36
32.
KREITNER, supra note 29, at 16.
33.
Id.
34.
HILLMAN, supra note 14, at 20-21.
35.
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 227-230 (Mark DeWolfe Howe
ed., 1963).
36.
As Fried points out, Holmes suggested that “reciprocal inducement” did not
strictly require an actual bargain. FRIED, supra note 25, at 30. Fried interprets Holmes’ suggestion to mean that consideration might be present in ”the kind of exchange that in general
constitutes an actual bargain . . . [even though] . . . the usual motive might be missing.” Id.
Fried argues for a promise-based theory of contract, but acknowledges that a theory of contract rooted in promises “is not exactly a statement of positive law.” Id. at 37. He does not,
however, concede that the bargain theory of contracts has better predictive power than the
“promise principle,” which he regards as the “moral basis of contracts.” Id. at 1. As he explains, “the doctrine of consideration offers no alternative basis for the force of contracts.”
Id. at 37-38.
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This framed most of the significant debates in contract theory for the remainder of the twentieth century as ones about the consideration requirement.37
A.

THE ROOTS OF CONTRACT IN PROPERTY

Prior to the nineteenth century, contract law was rooted in conceptions
of equity.38 It was only in the nineteenth century that courts began to move
beyond policing the fairness of exchanges and look to the underlying bargains as the source of the parties’ obligations.39 In fact, prior to the emergence of modern contract law, exchanges were governed by principles of
property.40 The paradigmatic transaction was the sale of land. Contracts for
the sale of land typically entailed promises to transfer title to the land in
return for the payment of a price. The common law doctrine of caveat emptor obviated the need for seller disclosures, and since buyers typically did
not need (or have the ability to obtain) third-party financing, there were
few, if any, contingencies placed upon closing.41 Indeed, early land transactions occurred without any prior contract of sale and were simply evidenced
by a deed transferring title for a price. The primary legal issues were related
to defects in the title and the adequacy of the consideration. The exchange
was instantaneous and involved “nothing corresponding to ‘contract’ in the
Anglo-American sense of the term.”42 As Lon Fuller and Melvin Eisenberg
described the transaction, “[e]ach party [became] the owner of a new thing,
and his rights rest[ed], not on a promise, but on property.”43
In the early stages of the development of contract, therefore, principles
of property regulated exchange. With industrialization came not only an
expansion of commercial activities, but also an increase in the complexity
of market transactions.44 Exchange no longer simply involved the passing
of title for a price; it increasingly involved promises. Ultimately, courts
began to hold that “a promise against a promise will maintain an action

37.
See, e.g., FRIED, supra note 25, at 37-38; GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF
CONTRACT (1974); P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1979).
38.
Morton Horowitz, The Historical Foundations of Modern Contract Law, 87
HARV. L. REV. 917, 917 (1974).
39.
As Horowitz notes, it was only then “for the first time that the source of the
obligation of contract [was] the convergence of the wills of the contracting parties.” Id.
40.
Id. at 919-20. See also LON FULLER & MELVIN EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT
LAW 121 (3d ed. 1972).
41.
Id.
42.
Horowitz, supra note 38, at 919, quoted in FULLER & EISENBERG, supra note 40,
at 121-22.
43.
Id., quoted in FULLER & EISENBERG, supra note 40, at 121.
44.
Horowitz, supra note 38, at 936.
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upon the case,”45 and the modern conception of contracts as an exchange of
promises triumphed.46 According to Morton Horowitz, however, vestiges of
property remained; indeed, “as late as the eighteenth century contract law
was still dominated by a title theory of exchange . . . .”47 One of the consequences was that damages were determined by principles of equity derived
from property law, and courts would sometimes limit damages or deny specific enforcement because the consideration was inadequate and the underlying exchange was, therefore, unfair.48
B.

THE SOUND PRICE RULE

Principles of equity and fair dealing thus insinuated themselves into
early commercial contract cases as well as real property cases. In the United
States, this led to the emergence of the rule that “a sound price warrants a
sound commodity.”49 The sound price rule was used not only to hold the
seller liable to the buyer for defects in title, but also in some cases for
breaches of implied warranties of quality.50 Thus, for example, in Torris v.
Long in 1799, the court held that if the jury determined that a “full price”
was paid for an “unsound” horse, the buyer would be entitled to damages;51
other cases from around the same time also acknowledged that where a full
price was paid the goods must normally be merchantable.52 But not all the
commercial cases were about implied warranties. In Bourke v. Bulow in
1787, the court upheld the jury’s decision to limit the plaintiff’s damages
for breach of a contract to deliver flour and tobacco to settle a prior obligation. The plaintiff argued that the damages were too low because the flour
and tobacco could have been resold for a profit, but the court characterized
the agreement as “a catching bargain” and stated that the jury “exercised a
very proper discretion” because “the jury have a right to give what they
think just, in proportion to the loss the party sustains.”53 Although the case
was ostensibly about damages, the jury in effect determined that the plain45.
THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 633-34
(1959).
46.
According to Horowitz, this was not until the end of the sixteenth century.
Horowitz, supra note 38, at 919.
47.
Id. at 920.
48.
Id. at 923-24.
49.
Id. at 926.
50.
Id.
51.
Torris v. Long, Tayl. 17 (N.C. Super. Ct. 1799).
52.
See, e.g., Dean v. Mason, 4 Conn. 428 (1822) (“For a long course of years, in
this state, there was an implied warranty as to quality supposed to be attached to every
sale.”); Whitefield v. McLeod, 2 Bay 380 (S.C. Const. 1802) (“The doctrine of a sound price
deserving a sound commodity . . . though a very wise and salutary one, had been bandied
about in our courts more than any other.”).
53.
Bourke v. Bulow, 1 Bay 49 (1 S.C.L.1787).
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tiff’s consideration was inadequate for the promise to deliver the flour and
tobacco.
C.

THE RISE OF CAVEAT EMPTOR

The sound price rule, and other precedents authorizing inquiries into
the adequacy of consideration, injected uncertainty into commercial contracts at a time when they were becoming more prevalent and increasing in
complexity.54 This encouraged many of the more sophisticated commercial
actors to circumvent the legal precedents and traditional means of legal
enforcement by conducting their transactions using independent bonds,
with damages specified for failures to perform.55 In fact, these practices
may have impeded the refinements of contract doctrines necessary to facilitate post-industrial commercial transactions by taking disputes out of the
courts and thus precluding judges from establishing new precedents.56
Nonetheless, courts eventually did begin to address post-industrial commercial disputes and render new holdings that increasingly deferred to the
will of the parties without regulating the equitableness of the commercial
transactions.57 It was only then that the sound price rule that had been so
prevalent during the eighteenth century was replaced by the doctrine of
caveat emptor.58 In Seixas v. Woods,59 for example, a leading American
case,60 the court held that there could be “no recovery against a merchant
who could not be proved knowingly to have sold defective goods.”61 To
break with the precedents that had established the sound price rule, the
court in Seixas looked to the common law, rather than the American cases,
and found no legal authority there for the sound price rule, but instead a
long tradition of upholding the doctrine of caveat emptor.62
The rejection of the sound price rule reflected a rejection of the idea
that courts should—or could—regulate the equitableness of commercial
54.
As Horowitz explains, the reliance on principles of equity mirrored a preindustrial economy in which it was possible to identify “customary prices” for most, if not
all, commodities. As markets began to expand and commercial activities increased during
the Industrial Revolution, these customary prices were undermined by competition, and
contract law began to assume a different role. Horowitz, supra note 38, at 936.
55.
Id. at 928.
56.
Id. at 931-32.
57.
Horowitz observes that the trend “toward overthrowing the traditional role of
courts in regulating the equity of agreements” began in England during Lord Mansfield’s
time before spreading to the United States, and continued throughout the nineteenth century.
Id. at 945.
58.
Id. at 946.
59.
Seixas v. Woods, 2 Cai. 48 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1804).
60.
Horowitz, supra note 38, at 945.
61.
Id.
62.
Seixas, 2 Cai. at 48.
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transactions by looking to the objective value of consideration.63 The substitution of caveat emptor for the sound price rule was the harbinger of broader retrenchments in the application of equitable principles to contracts.64
What emerged was a conception of contracts rooted in the will of the parties, and, increasingly, a jurisprudence that viewed contract law as instrumental to facilitating mutually gainful exchange. Principles of equity were
suppressed, and contract law finally emerged from the shadows of property;
in the process, a subjective theory of consideration emerged which rationalized nineteenth century laissez-faire economic doctrines that emphasized
the need to enforce express bargains rather than to regulate parties’ agreements.65 The subjective theory of consideration and the ascendance of a will
theory of contract created all the foundations necessary for the “entire conceptual apparatus of modern contract doctrine . . . [including] the evidentiary function of consideration.”66
It also more deeply entrenched the peppercorn theory. The principle
that inadequacy of consideration should not be a bar to contractual enforcement is an old one that apparently predates the development of the
modern doctrine of consideration.67 But the rationale for the principle was
clearly strengthened and more deeply entrenched by the ascendance of laissez-faire ideas in the late nineteenth century.68 As the modern doctrine of
consideration emerged, courts focused on procedural inequities, such as
fraud and duress,69 instead of regulating the substance of exchanges. They
often justified their laissez-faire approach with the argument that they were
unable to evaluate the size of consideration in complex transactions with
subjective values.70 The courts’ frequent pronouncements in favor of the
rule may have obscured the fact that it was only rarely the basis of their
decisions,71 but the peppercorn theory was adopted by the Restatement (Second) of Contracts on the grounds that “in many situations there is no reliable external standard of value” and “parties are thought to be better able
than others to evaluate the circumstances of particular transactions.”72
63.
Horowitz considers this to be a turning point in American contract law. As he
put it, “[T]he sudden and complete substitution of caveat emptor in place of the sound price
doctrine must . . . be understood as a dramatic overthrow of an important element of the
eighteenth century’s . . . conception of contract.” Horowitz, supra note 38, at 946.
64.
Id. at 947.
65.
Id.
66.
Id. at 952.
67.
Note, The Peppercorn Theory of Consideration and the Doctrine of Fair Exchange in Contract Law, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 1090, 1091 (1935).
68.
Id.
69.
Id.
70.
Id. at 1092.
71.
Id. at 1097.
72.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79 cmt. c (1981).

122

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34

One of the developments in contract law that occurred in conjunction
with the ascendance of the will theory of contracts and the subjective theory
of consideration was an increased focus on the exchange of promises by
rational individuals.73 Contracts thus no longer addressed questions about
whether gifts were valid, and distinctions were drawn between contracts
and quasi-contracts.74 This was part and parcel of the rise of the bargain
theory of contracts, which has dominated contract law since then. It was
also consonant with the laissez-faire ideology that emerged in response to
the pressures of a post-industrial commercial economy: by making the rational individual the main protagonist in the creation of enforceable contractual obligations, the will theory and related contract doctrines have limited the courts and the state to a supporting role in the vast majority of
commercial transactions.75 But the modernization of the law occurred
through the reinterpretation and refinement of legal doctrines, and it was
neither rapid nor complete. Old legal precedents die hard, and vestiges of
the pre-industrial legal order remained throughout the nineteenth century
and into the twentieth.76
D.

THE VESTIGES OF EQUITY

It is far from clear that pre-industrial principles of equity were ever
completely vetted from contract law. As Arthur Leff observed, when Article 2 of the U.C.C. was initially being drafted, the drafters were clearly
influenced by vestiges of the equity principles that had characterized contract law prior to the nineteenth century.77 This created particularly acute
73.
KREITNER, supra note 29, at 17.
74.
Id. at 28-29.
75.
Id. at 17.
76.
Indeed, according to Morton Horowitz, the “victory” of the will theory of contracts was not realized until William H. Story’s Treatise on the Law of Contract brought
coherence to the theory of implied contractual obligations that had persisted since the eighteenth century and the theory of express contracts based on the parties’ wills. Story achieved
the reconciliation by reinterpreting the role of courts in implied contracts as one of providing
a contract term that was intended but not memorialized by the parties themselves. Horowitz,
supra note 38, at 952. As Roy Kreitner writes:
Through the eighteenth century and into the early nineteenth,
inadequacy of consideration was deemed a good reason to reduce damages from the otherwise accepted expectation measure. And while explicit acknowledgment of this function of
consideration decreased over the course of the nineteenth century, it was still applied by the Supreme Court in a case in
1889.
KREITNER, supra note 29, at 28.
77.
Thus, he writes, “[f]rom the beginning the procedural unconscionability question was not posed in terms of what bargaining conduct, if any, would vitiate the agreement,
but whether there was bargaining conduct sufficient to insulate from judicial interference a
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difficulties in drafting what became the unconscionability provision in
U.C.C. section 2-302.78 Indeed, the thorniest question the drafters faced was
whether contracts could be voided simply because the consideration was
inadequate, regardless of whether the bargaining process raised suspicions
about the fairness of the parties’ dealings.79 It appears that they struggled
hard to find a compromise between the equitable principles that weighed in
favor of regulating the substance of contracts and the emerging conception
of rationality that undergirded both the will theory of contracts and the laissez-faire approach to markets and that militated against interfering with the
autonomy of private parties.80
Article 2, however, clearly expanded the scope of application of the
unconscionability doctrine beyond its pre-industrial territory. The sound
price rule and other principles of equity had traditionally been used to void
an entire contract.81 This was consistent with the conception of a contract as
a transfer of title to goods or real property in return for a price or other consideration and the use of the unconscionability doctrine to regulate the fairness of the exchange.82 If the consideration was inadequate, the deal was
not enforceable. This conception of the unconscionability doctrine no doubt
owed much to the context in which it developed, and that was one in which
transactions were relatively simple by modern standards. Thus, the primary
purpose of exchange was to realign property rights; sellers rarely made any
express covenants or warranties, and courts were not inclined to imply any
as a matter of law.83 Of course, this changed, not only because of the incontract which was, arguably, substantively ‘unconscionable.’” Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code – The Emperor’s New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 489 (1967).
78.
Vestiges of the equity principles that had been prevalent in the pre-industrial
legal order militated in favor of regulating the fairness of bargains, regardless of the bargaining process. At the same time, it was difficult for the drafters to conceive of how any reasonable commercial party could make an agreement that was substantively unconscionable.
According to Arthur Leff, the provisions from the 1941 draft of Article 2 “spoke throughout
as if it were inconceivable that there could exist simultaneously both particularized bargaining and an unfair contract.” Id. at 491.
79.
Id. at 489.
80.
The struggle manifested itself in deliberations about whether the unconscionability clause should require some defect in the bargaining process or whether a contract that
was substantively unfair because the consideration was inadequate could be voided regardless. As Arthur Leff documents, the drafters went back and forth on the matter and ultimately left the question largely unanswered. Id. at 491-98.
81.
Id. at 509.
82.
As Robert Hillman notes, “[t]he chancellors employed the doctrine of equitable
unconscionability most often, although not exclusively, in cases involving specific performance of land sales contract. Courts denied specific performance . . . if the exchange was
deemed inadequate . . . .” HILLMAN, supra note 14, at 131.
83.
Modern warranty law developed gradually in the twentieth century. For an
overview of the development of the law governing the creation of express warranties, see
Charles A. Heckman, “Reliance” or Common Honesty of Speech: The History and Interpre-
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creasing complexity of manufactured goods, but also because of the advent
of mass production and the shipment of goods from the places they had
been manufactured to distant retail stores from which they were sold. In the
post-industrial economy, sellers’ warranties about goods became much
more valuable to their buyers and, therefore, also to the sellers themselves.84 As a consequence, questions more frequently arose as to whether
particular clauses in a contract could be voided as substantively unfair.
Courts began to respond in the affirmative.85 It is no great surprise, therefore, that during the drafting of Article 2 the scope of the unconscionability
clause was extended beyond providing courts with authority to void entire
contracts to giving them the authority to use the unconscionability doctrine
with razor-like precision to void specific contract clauses.
Arthur Leff believed that this broadening of the scope of the unconscionability clause was “the most important single transformation disclosed
by [his] study of the drafting history [of Article 2].”86 In his view, providing
the courts with the power to regulate particular contract clauses delegated
considerably greater discretion to the courts over questions of public policy

tation of Section 2-313 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 38 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1 (1987);
for an overview of the development of the law governing implied warranties, see John Barker Waite, Retail Responsibility and Judicial Law Making, 34 MICH. L. REV. 494 (1936);
William L. Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L. REV. 117
(1943).
84.
One of the most important advances in modern microeconomics is a better
understanding of how informational problems can impede potentially gainful market transactions. As George Ackerloff explained in a now famous article, information asymmetries are
ubiquitous. George A. Ackerloff, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 494 (1970). Sellers typically know more about the
quality of their goods than buyers. Buyers are thus inclined to make purchase decisions
based on the average quality of all the goods in the market because they cannot accurately
evaluate the quality of any particular good. This discourages sellers from supplying high
quality goods to the market, since buyers are unwilling to pay a premium for them, and
encourages them instead to supply the market with “lemons.” If, however, sellers can credibly signal that their goods are high quality by warranting them to be such, the lemons problem can be surmounted. See Donald J. Smythe, The Scope of a Bargain and the Value of a
Promise, 60 S.C. L. REV. 203, 209-10 (2008) for a more thorough discussion.
85.
The official comments to Article 2 cite some of the cases. In Kansas City
Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Weber Packing Corp., 93 Utah 414 (1937), for instance, the court
essentially voided a clause limiting the time for the buyer to complain about defects in a
shipment of goods where the defects were latent and particularly difficult to discover; in
Austin Co. v. J.H. Tillman Co., 104 Or. 541 (1922), the court held that a clause limiting the
buyer’s right to return the goods was void where the seller had not delivered goods that met
the contract description; and in Hardy v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 38 Ga. App. 463
(1928), the court held that a disclaimer of warranties clause did not apply to an implied
warranty. See infra Part F.
86.
Leff, supra note 77, at 513.
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than they had been able to wield when limited to voiding entire contracts.87
In fact, in Leff’s view, this broadening of the unconscionability doctrine
gave courts too much discretion, since neither Article 2 nor the official
comments provided sufficient guidance as to how the “one-clause” variant
of unconscionability should be applied.88 Indeed, the only real guidance
provided for interpreting U.C.C. section 2-302 is in the official comments,
and these refer to a number of pre-U.C.C. cases. As Leff observed, however, all of the cases addressed questions about the validity of clauses that
purported to make warranty disclaimers or limit buyers’ remedies.89 Since
Article 2 elsewhere sought to regulate sellers’ warranty disclaimers and
limitations of remedies, Leff could see little purpose to having an unconscionability clause in the U.C.C.90 Although the drafters of Article 2
claimed their purpose in drafting U.C.C. section 2-302 was to follow the
ancient tradition in equity of regulating unconscionable contracts,91 Leff
concluded that they ultimately failed by broadening the scope of application
of the unconscionability doctrine without in any way clarifying how it
should be applied.92 Most importantly, the drafters failed to clarify whether
inadequate consideration was itself grounds for voiding a contract or contract clause or whether some defect in the bargaining process was also necessary.93
E.

REGULATING V. INTERPRETING BARGAINS

Leff argued that the test for unconscionability should include two
prongs: a test for whether there was a procedural abuse in the bargaining
process and a test for whether the consideration was inadequate.94 Leff’s
two-pronged test has become the majority approach.95 In theory, the twopronged test makes the doctrine of unconscionability cohere with the peppercorn doctrine, which precludes courts from considering the adequacy of
87.
As Leff puts it, “if one decides to police contracts on a clause-by-clause basis,
he finds that he has merely substituted the highly abstract word ‘unconscionable’ for the
possibility of more concrete and particularized thinking about particular problems of social
policy.” Id. at 515.
88.
Id. at 516.
89.
Id.
90.
As Leff notes, “both kinds of clauses dealt with in the official-comment cases
are totally regulated by sections of the Code other than 2-302.” Id. at 525.
91.
Leff, supra note 77, at 529.
92.
Id. at 538.
93.
Id.
94.
Id.
95.
See, e.g., CLAYTON P. GILLETTE & STEVEN D. WALT, SALES LAW: DOMESTIC
AND INTERNATIONAL 155 (1st ed. 1999) (“Unconscionability, according to most courts, contains both procedural and substantive elements. A contract or contract term is unconscionable only if it is both procedurally and substantively unconscionable.”).
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consideration in interpreting and enforcing a contract. But the most compelling contract questions, the ones that still raise the ghost of the ancient equity principles that the modern doctrinal reformulations of contract law have
sought to delimit, are about promises or affirmations that are not clearly
made by the seller, or waivers or limitations of remedies through contract
clauses that are not clearly assented to by the buyer.96 It is primarily the
cases in which there is some ambiguity about the terms of a contract that
illustrate how closely the peppercorn theory and unconscionability doctrine
relate to questions of contract interpretation, regardless of whether they are
actually applied. Indeed, the doctrine of unconscionability has arguably
always been closely related to issues of contract interpretation, in spite of
its characterization as a regulatory doctrine. This can be made most clearly
evident by a closer examination of the cases that the drafters cited in the
official comments to U.C.C. section 2-302.
F.

THE CASES CITED IN THE OFFICIAL COMMENTS TO U.C.C. SECTION 2-302

Consider each of the cases cited in the official comments:
In Kansas City Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Weber Packing Corp.,97 the
seller, Weber Corporation, contracted to deliver catsup to the buyer, Kansas
City Wholesale Grocery Co. After the catsup was delivered, however, it
was inspected by an agent from the Food and Drug Administration who
found that it was blighted by mold and subjected it to condemnation.98 Kansas City Wholesale sued Weber for breach of an implied warranty.99 Weber
Corporation defended itself against the claim in part by asserting a clause in
the contract that limited the time for the buyer to make claims for defects in
the goods to ten days after receipt. Kansas City’s claim was clearly not
made within that time.100 The court observed that under established precedent there was an implied warranty for latent defects and that no clause
unreasonably limiting the time for the buyer’s inspection could protect the
seller.101 What is perhaps most striking is that, although the case is the first
one cited in the official comments to U.C.C. section 2-302 to illustrate the
underlying basis of the unconscionability doctrine, the word “unconscionability” is nowhere mentioned. The central question in the case could just as
easily be construed as whether a clause limiting the time for complaint
should be interpreted to apply to complaints about latent defects as well as
96.
97.
1937).
98.
99.
100.
101.

See infra Part IV.
Kan. City Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Weber Packing Corp., 73 P.2d 1272 (Utah
Id. at 1273.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1275.
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patent ones as whether a clause limiting the time for complaint about a latent defect should be unconscionable. The case clearly dances on the fine
line between questions about unconscionability and contract interpretation.
In Hardy v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., the court held that language in the contract stating “no warranties have been made by the seller
unless indorsed hereon in writing” excluded express warranties but not implied ones.102 Once again, the case is noteworthy for the absence of any
mention of unconscionability. Indeed, in Hardy, the court expressly addressed the question in the case as a matter of contract interpretation.103
Since there were no issues of fact, the court construed the contract by looking to the language in the writing and employed contra proferentem, the
principle that ambiguities should be construed against the drafter.104 The
doctrine of contra proferentem was also applied by an English court in Andrews Bros. v. Singer & Co.105 In Andrews, it was used to limit the application of a warranty disclaimer to the “implied” warranty that a “new” car
was in fact new.106 Again, even though the court construed the question in
the case as one of contract interpretation, and even though the court was
English and not American, the case is cited in the official comments to
U.C.C section 2-302 to provide guidance on how the doctrine of unconscionability should be applied.
In New Prague Flouring Mill Co. v. Sprague, Spears contracted to buy
flour from New Prague through a traveling salesman.107 The terms of the
agreement were specified in a writing, which the court considered to be
unusually detailed for such an ostensibly routine transaction.108 After the
first two shipments of flour were delivered, however, Spears objected that
they were not “old wheat flour” as he had expected and refused to be bound
by the contract.109 New Prague did not concede that anything other than old
wheat flour had been delivered, but offered to replace the flour if it was
“not giving entire satisfaction.”110 New Prague sought to assert the terms in
the writing extending the delivery date for the flour against Spears, but
Spears claimed not to have read them and that New Prague’s salesman orally assured him that if he was not satisfied with the flour he could cancel the
contract.111 Upon cross examination, New Prague’s salesman affirmed that
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Hardy v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 144 S.E. 327 (Ga. Ct. App. 1928).
Id. at 328.
Id.
Andrews Bros. v. Singer & Co., 1 K.B. 17 (King’s Bench Division 1934).
Id.
New Prague Flouring Mill Co. v. Sprague, 189 N.W. 815, 816 (Iowa 1922).
Id.
Id. at 820.
Id.
Id.
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Spears did not read the writing and that he had not even produced it until he
and Spears had reached an agreement about the price and type of the flour
and the dates of delivery of the shipments.112 Although the court did not
allow the parole evidence to trump the written terms, it did treat the question in the case as one of contract interpretation and invoked contra
proferentem to void the written terms that extended New Prague’s delivery
date.113
A similar issue arose in Kansas Flour Mills Co. v. Dirks.114 In that
case, however, the writing was much shorter and simpler. It stated that if
Kansas Flour failed to deliver by December 30, 1914, Dirks could, as one
of his options, extend the time for delivery.115 After Kansas Flour failed to
deliver on December 30, on December 31, 1914, Dirks wrote Kansas Flour
to extend the time for delivery to January 15, 1915.116 When Kansas Flour
failed to make that delivery, Dirks sought damages based on the market
price as of January 15, 1915, instead of December 30, 1914.117 The difference was significant and in Dirk’s advantage. Kansas Flour argued that the
contract had already terminated on December 31, 1914, and that Dirks
could, at that point, no longer exercise his right to extend the time for delivery.118 Although Kansas Flour succeeded with this argument at trial, the
Supreme Court of Kansas overruled the lower court. As the supreme court
explained, Kansas Flour “should not be permitted to say that [the contract]
ended on December 30, when it was expressly agreed that it might be kept
alive for a longer time.”119 What is most striking for the purposes of this
Article is that the case can be construed so easily as a straightforward matter of contract interpretation. While the Supreme Court of Kansas’s interpretation of the contract comports better with the equities in the case than
the trial court’s, it also comports better with common sense and that, by all
appearances, was the basis for the Supreme Court of Kansas’s holding, rather than any conception that the terms of the contract needed to be regulated in fairness to the buyer.
In Joseph Green v. Arcos, Ltd., Green rejected a shipment of wood
products because the quantity was short.120 The preamble to the parties’
writing and a clause in the writing stated that the seller was entitled to vary

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Sprague, 189 N.W. at 821.
Id.
Kan. Flour Mill Co. v. Dirks, 164 P. 273 (Kan. 1917).
Id. at 274.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Dirks, 164 P. at 275.
Joseph Green v. Arcos, Ltd., 39 Lloyd’s List L.R. 84, 84 (1931).
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the quantity by ten percent.121 The variation in the shipment delivered was
greater than that and so it was clear that the seller breached.122 There was,
however, an additional clause in the writing that disclaimed the buyer’s
right to reject the goods.123 The central question in the case was whether
this clause barred Green from rejecting the shipment. The King’s Bench
interpreted the clause prohibiting rejections to pertain only to goods as
specified in the contract description.124 Since the goods Arco delivered did
not conform to the contract specification, the clause did not apply to them,
and Green had a right to reject the shipment.125 The court’s interpretation of
the contract was tenuous, at best, and may have had much to do with its
perception of the equities in the case, but it is notable that the court disposed of the question in the case as a matter of contract interpretation.
In Meyer v. Packard Cleveland Motor Co., Meyer bought a rebuilt
truck from Packard Cleveland Motor Co.126 Packard had advertised that its
rebuilt trucks were “ready to go to work” and “will give you the very best
of service.”127 Meyer signed a purchase order, however, that purportedly
waived any promises, understandings, or agreements not expressly made in
the purchase order, and, of course, the purchase order made no express warranties.128 When Meyer subsequently sued Packard for breach of warranty,
Packard asserted the waiver clause in its defense. Although Packard’s defense succeeded at trial, the Supreme Court of Ohio overruled the trial
court, and held that the waiver did not apply to an implied warranty created
by the sale of the rebuilt truck.129 The court noted that Meyer had paid
$4,200—“a substantial sum”—for the truck and “[t]he consideration to be
given Meyer for his $4,200 was not merely a shape of 5-ton size, but a
thing fitted for practical useful, substantial service as a dump truck.”130 Indeed, the court stated that the language in the purchase order that waived all
promises, understandings, or agreements not expressly made in the purchase order applied solely to any express agreements between the parties
and not to any contract terms implied by custom or usage of trade.131 The
case is interesting because it appears that the court addressed the issue as a
matter of contract interpretation but also clearly considered the contract
price.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id.
Id. at 86.
Id. at 85.
Id. at 87.
Arcos, 39 Lloyd’s List L.R. at 87
Meyer v. Packard Cleveland Motor Co., 140 N.E. 118 (Ohio 1922).
Id. at 119
Id. at 120.
Id.
Id.
Packard, 140 N.E. at 121.
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In F.C. Austin Co. v. J.H. Tillman Co., Austin sued Tillman for the
balance owed on an asphalt mixing plant; Tillman countersued for breach
of warranties.132 In fact, Tillman contended that the mixing plant that Austin delivered was not the one in the catalogue that he had ordered and that,
although Austin had modified the machine to suit his immediate needs, his
paving business nonetheless suffered as a result. Tillman therefore claimed
special damages.133 At trial, the jury awarded Tillman over $10,000.134 Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of Oregon construed the central question in
the case as whether the remedy to return the machine that was expressly
stated in the purchase order was an exclusive one or cumulative.135 The
majority of the court held that Austin’s obligation to deliver a machine that
conformed to the contract was a condition precedent to Tillman’s remedy
being limited to the return of the machine.136 As the dissenting opinion noted, however, the purchase order expressly limited Tillman’s remedy to the
return of the machine.137 The dissenting opinion appeared to reject the idea
that principles of equity should trump express contract terms:
In construing . . . contracts, the object to be attained is the intent of the parties; but this intent
must be ascertained if possible by the language
which the parties themselves have adopted and
used . . . and not by reading into it words that import an intent and understanding wholly unintended
and unexpressed when the contract was written, but
suggested by some apparent hardship in the enforcement thereof.138
Nonetheless, this merely emphasizes that if principles of equity factored in
the case, it was arguably through the majority’s interpretation of the contract rather than in any direct regulation of the contract terms. There was no
discussion in the case of guile or deception in the negotiations or anything
else that smacked of modern unconscionability analysis.
In Bekkevold v. Potts, Bekkevold sued Potts for breach of an implied
warranty on a tractor and related equipment.139 In defense, Potts asserted
language in the contract of sale that stated: “no warranties have been made .

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

F.C. Austin Co. v. J.H. Tillman Co., 209 P. 131, 144 (Or. 1922).
Id. at 133.
Id.
Id. at 135.
Id.
Tillman, 209 P. at 146.
Id. (quoting Nave v. Powell, 96 N.E. 395 (Ind. App. 1911)).
Bekkevold v. Potts, 216 N.W. 790 (Minn. 1927).
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. . unless expressly written hereon at the date of purchase.”140 The Supreme
Court of Minnesota observed that an implied warranty is “imposed by the
law . . . to promote high standards in business and to discourage sharp dealings.”141 It did not, however, discuss the doctrine of unconscionability, nor
did it treat the case as one arising in equity. Instead, the court construed the
question as whether the waiver language included within its scope implied
warranties created by law as well as express warranties created by the seller. It concluded that the parties’ intent was not to exclude the implied warranty.142 What is significant, again, is that a case cited for its illustration of
the doctrine of unconscionability was, in fact, one in which the central
question could so easily be construed as a matter of contract interpretation.
Finally, in Robert A. Munro & Co. v. Meyer, which was another English case, the English plaintiff, Munro, sued the German defendant, Meyer,
for the unpaid price of two installments of meat and bone meal.143 In his
defense, Meyer asserted that Munro had breached warranties under the Sale
of Goods Act of 1893, a statute under which English sales law had been
codified in the late nineteenth century.144 Munro, however, attributed the
defects to the manufacturer of the meal and disclaimed any responsibility as
the wholesaler.145 Indeed, Munro cited language in the contract that stated
the goods were to be taken “with all faults and defects, damaged or inferior.”146 The court, however, held that the wording did not exclude the implied warranty that the goods should conform to the contract description,
and that, because of the defects, the goods in this case did not conform to
the contract description.147 Meyer also argued that the doctrine of mutual
mistake should apply, since neither they nor Munro were aware of the defects in the meal.148 The court rejected Meyer’s argument in part because it
was unable to find that “the making of the contract was conditioned by the
mistake.”149 Moreover, the court noted that the doctrine of mistake arose in
equity and that the cases in which it had applied had been comparatively
simple, whereas the case at hand was complex and restitution could not so
easily be achieved.150 This left the court with the task of measuring damages. To that task, the court, without expressly stating so, appeared to apply
140.
141.
142.
143.
1930).
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id.
Id. at 791.
Id.
Robert A. Munro & Co. v. Meyer, 2 K.B. 312, 315 (King’s Bench Division
Id.
Id. at 328.
Id. at 327.
Id.
Meyer, 2 K.B. at 329.
Id. at 335.
Id. at 335-36.
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the expectations damages rule.151 There is nothing in the case that particularly illustrates how principles of equity might apply to void a contract or a
clause of a contract; rather, the case appears to turn on the court’s interpretation of the effect of waiver language in the contract.
F.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

What is most striking about the cases cited in the official comments to
U.C.C. section 2-302 is that all of them can be construed as being about
matters of contract interpretation. If they figure at all, principles of equity
appear to provide a subtext for the courts’ opinions rather than a basis for
their decisions. There is certainly nothing in the cases to suggest they are
about whether the contracts or clauses of the contracts should be voided,
nor is there anything remotely similar to Arthur Leff’s two-prong test for
unconscionability. What the cases illustrate more strongly than anything
else, therefore, is the fine line between the doctrine of unconscionability
and questions of contract interpretation. Unconscionability cases are rare,
especially when they involve sophisticated business parties, but cases between sophisticated business parties involving disputes over the interpretation of their contracts are not. Given the fine line between the unconscionability doctrine and contract interpretation, it should not be surprising if in
some cases courts have evaluated the adequacy of consideration in rendering holdings about the interpretation of contracts. In fact, not only are there
recent sales cases in which courts have evaluated the adequacy of contract
prices in interpreting ambiguous contract clauses, but the official comments
to the U.C.C. authorized them to do so.152 Unfortunately, because there are
no guidelines for courts to follow in evaluating the adequacy of consideration, when they have done so they have not always made their logic clear,
nor has it always been evident whether they have done so prudently.153 The
next section of this Article attempts to provide some practical guidelines.
III.

AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF BARGAINS

One of the basic postulates of economic theory is that rational parties
will seek to earn gains from trade through mutually advantageous bargains.
Unfortunately, economic theorists have struggled to develop a general theory of bargaining that can accurately predict how the parties to bargains
share in the gains from trade.154 There is, therefore, no universally accepted
151.
Id. at 336-37.
152.
See infra Part IV.
153.
See infra Part IV.
154.
For a useful survey of various bargaining models, see ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES
AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY 357-379 (1997).
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economic model upon which to base an economic analysis of bargains. That
does not, however, mean that the economic analysis is pointless; what it
means is that it can only establish parameters within which rational parties
might conclude the terms of their bargains. As it turns out, even establishing these parameters is very useful; not least of all, they help to identify
circumstances in which an evaluation of the contract price will not aid in
the interpretation of other contract terms; beyond that, they also help to
indicate how the contract price should be used in cases where it can aid in
the interpretation of other contract terms.
Consider the market for some generic good. Assume that all potential
buyers and sellers are risk-neutral, profit-maximizers, and attach no psychological values to the good or anything else.155 Since they attach no psychological values to the good, the buyers’ expected valuations and the sellers’
expected costs can be expressed entirely in monetary terms. Assume, for
convenience, that transaction costs are zero.156 Assume that all actual trades
155.
To assume that an agent is a profit maximizer is tantamount to assuming that the
only criterion in the agent’s utility function is profits. This assumption is consonant with a
focus on commercial contracts between sophisticated merchant-buyers and merchant-sellers.
156.
This makes the analysis distinctively “neoclassical” in the narrow sense. As a
general matter, transaction costs are almost impossible to specify precisely, but they would
normally include all the costs of negotiating the contract terms and memorializing them in
writing, as well as the expected costs associated with enforcing the agreement and the uncertainty about whether it would be completed successfully. There is a growing economics
literature that relates the costs of contracting to parties’ contract-specific investments, their
subsequent decisions about whether to renegotiate their contracts, and courts’ interpretations
of the contracts. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Joel Watson, The Law and Economics of Costly
Contracting, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 2, 3-5 (2004); Steven Shavell, On the Writing and Interpretation of Contract, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 289 (2006); Jesse Bull, Costly Evidence Production and the Limits of Verifiability, 8 B.E.J. THEORETICAL ECON. 1 (2008); Pierpaolo
Battigalli & Giovanni Maggi, Costly Contracting in a Long-Term Relationship, 39 RAND. J.
ECON. 352 (2008). Some of this literature suggests that in an efficient legal system courts
might not always interpret contracts as accurately as possible, and indeed the parties themselves might like to restrict courts’ use of extrinsic evidence in interpreting their contracts.
The basic ideas have contributed to a recent neo-formalist argument in favor of a strict parole evidence rule. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Interpretation Redux,
119 YALE L.J. 826, 931 (2010). See also Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory
and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541 (2003); Robert E. Scott & George G.
Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115 YALE L.J. 814 (2006); Jody S.
Kraus & Robert E. Scott, Contract Design and the Structure of Contractual Intent, 84
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1023 (2009). Most of this literature, however, assumes that parties have what
Richard Posner has described as a kind of “hyperrationality”—an almost super-human capacity to process information and calculate optimal strategies commonly assumed in complex dynamic games. POSNER, supra note 4, at 22-26. Perhaps not surprisingly, Posner has
offered a law and economics critique of the neo-formalist analysis and a more traditional law
and economics view of parole evidence. See Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of
Contract Interpretation, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1581 (2005). Some of the uses of the contract price
suggested in this Article would require the admission of parole evidence, but others would
not. Nonetheless, this Article presumes that parties are “intentionally rational but only limit-
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are the result of bargains that are supported by contracts, and that the contracts are defined by a finite number of terms, specifying (although perhaps
ambiguously) promises or disclaimers, as well as a contract price. Assume
that the seller’s promises increase the expected marginal value of the good
to the buyer but also increase the seller’s expected marginal costs and that
the seller’s disclaimers do the converse—that is, decrease the seller’s expected marginal costs but also decrease the expected marginal value of the
good to the buyer. Finally, assume that the expected marginal values and
expected marginal costs of the contract terms are separable and additive—
in other words, that the expected marginal value (and expected marginal
costs) of any particular promise or disclaimer does not affect the expected
marginal value (and expected marginal costs) of any other promise or disclaimer, and, therefore, that the expected total value of the good to the buyer (and the expected total costs of the good to the seller) is just the sum of
the expected marginal values (expected marginal costs) of all the contract
terms.157
Each buyer’s expected total valuation of the good and each seller’s expected total costs of supplying the good would depend on the terms of their
contract. From an economic perspective, however, a sale of the good by the
seller to the buyer would be socially desirable if and only if it generated a
surplus, defined here as a positive difference between the buyer’s expected
total valuation of the good and the seller’s expected total costs in supplying
it. But the transaction would not be economically efficient unless it generated the maximum amount of surplus possible and thus maximized the parties’ gains from trade. The sale would maximize the parties’ gains from
trade if and only if the contract terms were chosen so as to add surplus value to the transaction whenever possible. In other words, the contract would
have to include all surplus-increasing warranties and disclaimers and exclude all surplus-decreasing warranties and disclaimers. It is a basic postulate of economic theory that if the parties were perfectly rational and transaction costs were zero, they would realize all potential gains from trade and
the transaction would be economically efficient. The contract for the transaction would, thus, include only surplus-increasing terms—that is, terms
whose expected marginal value to the buyer exceeded their expected marginal costs to the seller (and thus would include no terms whose expected
edly so” and that it is generally advisable for courts to interpret their contracts as accurately
as possible. HERBERT SIMON, MODELS OF MAN, at xxiv (1957). This is consistent with the
more traditional approach to law and economics taken by scholars such as Posner, although
perhaps not couched in quite the same language.
157.
The assumption that the expected marginal valuations and expected marginal
costs of the contract terms are separable and additive does preclude addressing complex
interactions between contract clauses. Nonetheless, this does not limit the generality of any
conclusions.
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marginal value to the buyer was less than their expected marginal costs to
the seller).
Although an economically efficient contract would, by definition, necessarily maximize the total surplus generated by the parties’ trade, it could
entail the parties trading at a range of prices depending on their relative
bargaining power. At one extreme, if the seller had all the bargaining power, or, in terms of a market reference, had pure monopoly power and was
able to engage in perfect price discrimination,158 the contract price would
equal the expected total value the buyer derived from the transaction; this
would be equivalent to the seller’s expected total costs plus the total surplus
generated by the transaction. Regardless of how we think about it, the seller’s surplus from the transaction would equal the maximum amount possible. At the other extreme, if the buyer had all the bargaining power, or, in
terms of a market reference, had pure monopsony power and was able to
engage in perfect price discrimination159 (or, alternatively, if the transaction
occurred in a long-run, perfectly competitive market equilibrium),160 the
contract price would equal the expected total costs to the seller of fulfilling
its obligations under the contract, and the buyer would therefore derive the
entire amount of economic surplus generated by the transaction.
If the bargaining power was shared between the seller and buyer, then
the contract price would lie somewhere in between these two extremes. If
the parties were perfectly rational, therefore, and drafted an economically
efficient contract that realized all potential gains from trade, the contract
price could lie anywhere in between a perfectly price-discriminating pure
monopolist’s price and a perfectly price-discriminating pure monopsonist’s
price (or, alternatively, the price in a perfectly competitive, long-run equilibrium). In short, a rational bargain could be consistent with a wide range
of contract prices. In fact, that is the most glaring failure of the economic
theory of bargaining: it can adequately characterize and predict which bargains will occur, but there is no general economic model that can predict
the prices at which the parties will transact with any significant precision or
degree of empirical reliability.
158.
A seller is able to engage in perfect price discrimination if he or she is able to
charge each individual buyer the highest price the buyer is willing to pay for the good; since
different buyers will generally place different values on the good, this means the seller must
be able to charge a different price to each buyer. That is the only kind of discrimination
contemplated by the term. HENDERSON & QUANTDT, supra note 7, at 182-85.
159.
A perfectly price discriminating buyer would be able to buy the good for the
lowest price the seller was possibly willing to accept. In the long run, this would be a price
that just covered the seller’s expected costs. Id. at 190-92.
160.
In a long run perfectly competitive equilibrium, the market price is equal to the
average total cost of the good. This corresponds to the seller’s expected total costs in this
analysis. Id. at 146-49.
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A.

USING ECONOMIC THEORY TO INTERPRET AMBIGUOUS CONTRACT
TERMS

Even sophisticated parties who have carefully negotiated and drafted
their contracts occasionally have disputes about the meaning of contract
terms. The rationality assumptions that characterize conventional economic
theory are helpful in developing hypotheses about how people might behave, but only the most dogmatic or idealistic theorists would argue that
people are always perfectly rational. Indeed, most professional economists
today probably believe that people are “intentionally rational, but only limitedly so.”161 The persistence of perfect rationality assumptions in relatively
simple economic models reflects their usefulness as an approximation to
human behavior rather than any unrealistic conceptions about human capabilities. In the analysis offered here, perfect rationality assumptions are
helpful in establishing some of the parameters within which parties who are
intelligent and profit seeking will devise the terms for their trades. But it
would obviously be a mistake to presume that real world parties are so “hyper-rational” that they always draft their contract terms unambiguously.
In fact, given the limitations on real-world parties’ rationality, it is inevitable that some ambiguities will arise in the interpretation of many contracts. The important question is whether economic analysis can provide
any guidance in resolving the ambiguities. Suppose there was an ambiguity
about one of the terms in a particular contract. Suppose the seller and buyer
had a dispute about whether one particular promise or disclaimer had been
made as a part of their bargain. Would it be reasonable for a court to use
economic analysis to draw any inferences about whether the promise or
disclaimer was an intended part of the parties’ bargain? In particular, could
a court reasonably ever use evidence about the contract price to draw such
inferences? The short answer is yes; the next parts of this section will elaborate. For simplicity, the discussion will focus on a dispute about whether a
particular term is a part of the parties’ bargain, and it will suppose that
whatever writing and/or parole evidence that is admissible to determine
whether the term is part of the contract is ambiguous. Within these parameters, the contract price might aid in determining whether the term is an intended part of the parties’ bargain through (1) cost-benefit comparisons, (2)
comparisons of the contract price to prices in other contracts made by the
same buyer and seller, and (3) comparisons of the contract price to other
market prices.
161.
This is the conception of economic rationality proposed by the Nobel Prizewinning economist, Herbert Simon. It acknowledges that there are limits on humans’ cognitive abilities and that the costs of acquiring and processing information can be high. See
SIMON, supra note 156.
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COST-BENEFIT COMPARISONS USING THE CONTRACT PRICE

In an economically efficient bargain, the seller would never make a
promise if the expected marginal costs of doing so exceeded the expected
marginal value of the promise to the buyer; similarly, the seller would always make a disclaimer if the expected marginal cost savings of the disclaimer exceeded the decrease in expected marginal value to the buyer. This
might provide a basis for determining whether a disputed promise was an
intended part of the parties’ bargain. For instance, if the parties were rational enough to achieve an economically efficient bargain, and if there was
sufficient evidence to prove that the expected marginal costs of a promise
clearly exceeded its expected marginal value, a court would be justified in
finding that the promise was not part of the bargain. Conversely, if the presumption of rationality was sufficiently strong and the evidence was sufficient to prove that the expected marginal value of the promise clearly exceeded its expected marginal costs, a court would be justified in finding that
the promise was a part of the bargain.
In practice, this kind of calculation could be within the capabilities of
most courts. For instance, if the disputed contract term was a performance
warranty, evidence about the expected marginal costs of making the warranty and the expected marginal value of the warranty might be available
from the testimony of industry experts or insurance actuaries. Indeed, in
some cases, the cost-benefit comparisons might be relatively simple, and
the contract price could be very helpful in making them. From the seller’s
perspective, the contract price represents an upper bound on the expected
total costs that any rational seller would incur to supply any particular good.
If the seller’s expected marginal costs of providing the contract term in dispute exceeded the contract price, that would provide evidence that the term
was not an intended part of the parties’ bargain. If the expected marginal
costs of providing the disputed term were so high that they must surely
cause the seller’s expected total costs to exceed the contract price, thus
leaving the seller with negative surplus from the transaction, that would
also suggest the term was not a part of the bargain.162 From the buyer’s perspective, the contract price represents a lower bound on the expected total
value that any rational buyer would have to derive from the good without
the disputed term in order to be willing to agree to the bargain. If the price
was above the expected total value the buyer derived from the good, the
buyer would derive negative surplus from the transaction. Since a rational
buyer would never agree to a bargain that left her with negative surplus,

162.
See infra Part IV.A; McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Thiokol Corp., 124 F.3d 1173
(9th Cir. 1997).
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that would suggest that the disputed term was a part of the intended bargain.163
The problem with simple cost-benefit evaluations such as these is that
they might only rarely be helpful. In most cases, the expected marginal
costs to the seller of providing the disputed term—and even the seller’s
expected total costs of supplying the good with the disputed term—will be
less than the contract price, and the buyer’s expected total valuation of the
good without the disputed term will be greater than the contract price. Thus,
the cost-benefit comparisons will often not be of much probative value. A
cautious approach is probably best, and courts might do more harm than
good by drawing inferences in cases where the cost-benefit comparisons
shed too little light. The question is whether economic analysis can provide
any other kind of help in all the cases that fall within the extremes. As the
next two parts explain, if appropriate evidence is available, empirical inferences might still be helpful.
C.

COMPARISONS OF THE CONTRACT PRICE TO PRICES IN PREVIOUS
CONTRACTS

One way in which the contract price might still provide useful information in cases where cost-benefit comparisons are unavailing is through
comparisons of the contract price to the prices in other contracts made by
the same buyer and/or seller. The simplest cases would be ones in which the
same buyer and seller had previously contracted, and the terms of their previous contracts were clear and known. Such cases are not as rare as one
might initially imagine.164 Suppose there were some previous contracts between the same buyer and seller which were otherwise identical, but some
included the disputed term and some excluded it. If the contract price in the
contract under dispute was within the range of the prices in previous contracts that included the term but outside the range of prices in previous contracts that excluded the term, that would provide important evidence that
the disputed term was an intended part of the contract. Unless there was
also evidence that the parties’ relative bargaining power, or the seller’s
costs, or market conditions had changed significantly, it would be difficult
to understand why the parties’ bargain would not include the disputed term
at that contract price. Conversely, if the contract price were outside the
range of prices in previous contracts that included the disputed term, but
within the range of prices in contracts that excluded the term, it would be

163.
See infra Part IV.B.
164.
The Royal cases, which raised questions about the buyer’s reliance on the seller’s promises in light of the buyer’s experience with the goods, are of exactly this type. See
Royal Bus. Mach., Inc. v. Lorraine Corp., 633 F.2d 34 (7th Cir. 1980).
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reasonable to infer that the disputed term was an intended part of the contract.
Of course, the circumstances might not present such a rich wealth of
evidence. Suppose, for instance, all the previous contracts were ones that
included the disputed term. Even in that case, a comparison of the contract
price to the previous prices might still be helpful.165 Suppose the disputed
term was one that was clearly valued by the buyer and costly to the seller. If
the contract price were above or within the range of the prices in previous
contracts that included the term, this would provide some evidence that the
disputed term was also included in the contract in question.166 On the other
hand, if the contract price were below the lowest price in the previous contracts, this would be consistent with the claim that the term in dispute had
been excluded from the contract in question, but it would not, by itself, be
sufficient to resolve the matter. Suppose, for instance, that the contract price
was only marginally less than the lowest price in the previous contracts.
That would provide much weaker evidence that the disputed term was not
intended to be included in the contract than if the contract price were considerably less than the lowest price in the previous contracts. This raises the
question, when could a court reasonably infer that the term was not an intended part of the parties’ bargain?
If evidence could be provided about the expected marginal costs that
the seller would incur as a result of the disputed term, that might help answer the question. Suppose there was plausible evidence that the expected
marginal costs to the seller of including the term would fall within a particular range. This could be used to establish a plausible hypothetical range of
prices for contracts between the two parties that did not include the disputed
term. An upper bound on the range of prices could be established by subtracting the lowest estimate of the expected marginal costs of the disputed
term from the highest price in any of the previous contracts. A lower bound
could be established by subtracting the highest estimate of the expected
marginal costs from the lowest price in any of the previous contracts. It
would be reasonable to infer that if the contract price was above the upper
bound of this plausible hypothetical range, it was probably too high for the
contract not to have included the term. If the contract price was below this
upper bound, then it might be reasonable to infer that the contract did not
include the disputed term; the further the contract price was below the up-

165.
Indeed, the Royal cases are of exactly this type, and, as the discussion below
elaborates, the price comparisons not only seem to offer meaningful insights but might also
have inclined courts to decide the cases differently. Id.
166.
This would be in addition, of course, to any evidence provided by the previous
contracts about the parties’ course of dealings. See U.C.C. § 1-303 (1977) (amended 2003).
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per bound, the more likely that the disputed term was not an intended part
of the parties’ bargain.167
Suppose instead that the previous contracts did not include the disputed term and the price in the contract in question was above the range of
previous prices. But suppose that it was not clear whether the contract price
was so high that the contract must include the disputed term. And suppose
again there was plausible evidence that the expected marginal costs to the
seller of including the term would fall within a particular range. A lower
bound for the plausible hypothetical range of prices in bargains between the
parties that included the disputed term could be established by adding the
lowest estimate of the expected marginal costs to the lowest price in any of
the previous contracts that excluded the term. An upper bound could be
established by adding the highest estimate of the expected marginal costs to
the highest price in any of the previous contracts. If the price in the contract
under dispute were significantly below the lower bound, then it would
probably be too low for the contract to have included the term. If the contract price were above this lower bound, then it might include the term; of
course, the higher the price, the greater the likelihood.168
This kind of analysis should be within the capabilities of most
courts.169 Nonetheless, in a close case, comparisons of this kind might provide relevant and reliable guidance on difficult interpretive questions even
if they are not, by themselves, dispositive. The point is not that any inferences can be drawn with absolute certainty; rather, it is that the contract
price together with evidence about past contracts between the parties and
plausible estimates of the expected marginal costs to the seller of including
any disputed term in the contract might provide relevant and reasonably
167.
For example, suppose the range of prices in previous contracts that included the
disputed term was from $9 to $10 per unit of the good. Suppose the lowest estimate of the
expected marginal cost of the disputed term to the seller was $2 per unit and the highest was
$3 per unit. Then the hypothetical range of prices for contracts that did not include the term
would be from $6 to $8 per unit. If the price in the contract under dispute were $8.50, this
would provide some evidence that the parties probably intended to include the term in their
contract; if the price in the contract under dispute were only $7, this would provide some
evidence that the parties probably did not intend to include the term in their contract.
168.
For example, suppose the range of prices in previous contracts that did not
include the disputed term was from $9 to $10 per unit of the good. Suppose there was plausible evidence that the expected marginal costs to the seller of including the term could have
ranged from $2 to $3 per unit of the good. Then the hypothetical range of prices in contracts
that included the term would be from $11 to $13 per unit. If the price in the contract under
dispute were only $10.50, it would be reasonable for a court to infer that the contract in
question did not include the disputed term. If the price were $12 per unit, however, it would
be reasonable for a court to infer that the contract probably did include the disputed term.
169.
It nonetheless arguably should meet the prevailing standard for the admissibility
of expert evidence under Daubert. See D.G. Owen, A Decade of Daubert, 80 DEN. U. L.
REV. 345, 346 (2002) (discussing Daubert).
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reliable evidence about the parties’ intended bargain. In some cases the
comparisons might be obvious and especially helpful.170 Of course, in many
cases there might not be any previous contracts between the buyer and seller, or the previous contracts may also have been ambiguous about whether
they included the disputed term, so comparisons of this kind might not be
feasible; in many other cases the comparisons might not be helpful even if
they are feasible. Nonetheless, it might still be possible to help draw inferences about whether the parties intended a contract to include a disputed
term by comparing the contract price to “market prices”—that is, prices in
contracts between other buyers and sellers.171
D.

COMPARISONS OF THE CONTRACT PRICE TO MARKET PRICES

If there were many buyers and sellers contracting in the market for the
same good, the market outcome could be defined by all the prices and other
terms in the contracts between each buyer-seller pair. A sample of these
contract prices and terms would thus provide a sample of the market outcomes. The market outcomes could be consistent with any kind of market
equilibrium from, at one extreme, one consistent with the economic theory
of a perfectly discriminating pure monopoly to, at the other extreme, one
consistent with the economic theory of a long-run, perfectly competitive
market equilibrium. Indeed, some of the contracts could reflect a split of the
parties’ gains from trade consistent with the former and others could reflect
a split of the parties’ gains from trade consistent with the latter. More generally, the market outcomes might not reflect any single, coherent economic
theory about market behavior. Nonetheless, as long as the parties were perfectly rational—or near enough to perfectly rational to justify the fundamental postulates about rational bargaining described above—each of the
contracts in the sample would have been devised so that the parties could
achieve the maximum amount of gains from trade possible and thus, maximize the amount of surplus generated by their transaction. This might still
provide a basis for using the contract price to draw inferences about whether an ambiguous contract term was an intended part of any particular party’s bargain.

170.
In some cases there may be only one previous contract between the parties to
use as a base of comparison. Such cases are particularly likely to arise when the seller attempts to use the buyer’s knowledge of or experience with the good to challenge whether the
buyer could have relied on the seller’s promises or affirmations about it. Indeed, in such
cases, the comparison might prove especially helpful. See infra Part IV.B.
171.
To be more precise, the other contracts would have to include at least one party
who was not a party to the contract in dispute. They could also, of course, include two different parties.
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Suppose two parties had a dispute about whether a particular term was
included in their contract for some homogenous good.172 Suppose there
were market observations of some contracts that excluded the disputed term
but were otherwise identical. The prices in these contracts could be used to
define a market price range for contracts that excluded the disputed term.
Suppose there were also market observations of other contracts that did
include the disputed term but were otherwise identical. The prices in these
contracts could be used to define a market price range for contracts that did
include the disputed term. Suppose the price in the contract in question was
within the market range for contracts that excluded the disputed term but
outside the market range for contracts that included the term.173 That would
obviously provide some evidence that the disputed term was not an intended part of the parties’ bargain. And, of course, the converse suppositions
would imply the converse conclusion.
There are some obvious limitations to this kind of analysis. For one
thing, goods are rarely homogeneous. Thus, price differences might reflect
differences in the quality or other characteristics of the goods rather than
simply different contract terms. For another, other contract terms might
vary across buyers and sellers, and it might be difficult or even impossible
to identify market price ranges for contracts that excluded and included the
disputed term holding all other contract terms constant. Even setting these
very important practical problems aside, however, the comparison still
might not be helpful. Suppose, for instance, the price in the contract in
question was higher than the market range for contracts that excluded the
disputed term but lower than the market range for contracts that included
the term. Alternatively, suppose the market price ranges for the contracts
that excluded and included the disputed term overlapped, and the price in
the contract under dispute was higher than the lowest price for contracts
that excluded the term but lower than the highest price for contracts that
included the term. In either of these cases, a simple comparison of the contract price to market prices would fail to provide any probative evidence.
The question then is: could a more sophisticated comparison of the
contract price to market prices prove helpful? Perhaps the best answer is a
172.
One of the complications in basing the analysis on a comparison of the contract
price to market prices is that there are often qualitative differences between sellers’ goods
that are unrelated to any of the contract terms. Unfortunately, this would confound the analysis.
173.
This scenario is very similar to the one addressed by the Tenth Circuit in Universal Drilling. See Universal Drilling Co. v. Camay Drilling Co., 737 F.2d 869 (10th Cir.
1984). In fact, it is virtually equivalent to any case in which a court uses expert testimony
about the market value of goods in relation to the contract price of the goods, since the market valuation should be based on empirical evidence about the prices at which other buyers
and sellers would trade the goods in the market. See infra Part IV.A.
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very cautious maybe. In theory, a more systematic statistical analysis of the
data might still prove to be fruitful; in practice, it might simply end in a
duel between competing experts that proved of no particular probative value. Consider the most optimistic scenario: assume that all prices in the
sample of contracts without the disputed term were normally distributed
around some mean and that all prices in the sample of contracts with the
disputed term were normally distributed around some mean. Assume that
all the contracts were otherwise identical. It would be possible then to calculate both the mean price and the standard deviation of the price in each of
the samples. In principle, these statistics could provide a basis for determining whether the contract in question was more likely drawn from the universe of contracts that excluded the disputed term or the universe that included the term.
To provide some concrete intuition, suppose that the price in the contract in question was within one standard deviation of the mean of the price
in all contracts that excluded the term, but more than two standard deviations from the mean in contracts that included the term. It might then be
reasonable to infer that the contract in dispute was more likely drawn from
the universe of contracts that excluded the term than from the universe of
contracts that included it. In theory, a more precise analysis could even provide the probabilities that the disputed contract was drawn from each of the
two universes. The evidence would obviously not be conclusive, but it
might still be probative and in a difficult case could be of great value.
Of course, this is an exceptionally optimistic scenario. In practice, the
data might very well be too complex for such simple inferences. Suppose
the sellers’ goods were heterogeneous or only a small number of the contracts had identical terms (except for the term under dispute). That would
preclude the possibility of drawing any reliable statistical inferences from
sample means and standard deviations. If the number of observations were
large enough to provide sufficient degrees of freedom, it might still be possible to draw inferences from an econometric analysis with appropriately
devised binary variables. In theory, an econometric model could be used to
generate sample mean prices for contracts identical to the one in dispute
that excluded and included the disputed term. In theory, the model could
also generate the sample variances and provide a basis for evaluating
whether the contract in dispute more likely included the disputed term than
not. One can only suspect, however, that the more sophisticated the econometric methods, the more tenuous the inferences. At some point, the probative value of the price comparisons might not be worth the costs. Indeed,
given the nuances of econometric methods, one wonders whether a more
sophisticated econometric analysis of this kind would not simply end in a
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confounding duel between expert witnesses that proved of no real probative
value. Courts might be wise not to open that Pandora’s box.174
E.

A SUMMARY OF THE PROPOSED GUIDELINES

The analysis suggests three ways in which the contract price might be
able to help in the interpretation of contracts:
1. Through a cost-benefit inquiry: If the expected marginal costs to the
seller of providing the disputed term would have been greater than the contract price or if they would have clearly pushed the seller’s expected total
costs over the contract price, then no rational seller would have concluded
the contract with the term. Conversely, if the expected total value of the
good to the buyer without the disputed term would have been so much less
than the contract price that the buyer would clearly have been left with negative surplus, or, in other words, an empty bargain, then no rational buyer
would have concluded the contract without the term.
2. By comparing the contract price to prices in other contracts between
the same buyer and seller: if the contract price is within the actual or plausible range of prices for contracts between the buyer and seller that include
the term but is not within the actual or plausible range of prices for contracts between the buyer and seller that do not include the term, then it is
reasonable to infer that the parties intended to include the term in their bargain. Conversely, of course, if the contract price is outside the actual or
plausible range of prices for contracts between the buyer and seller that
include the term but within the actual or plausible range of prices for contracts between the buyer and seller that do not include the term, then it is
reasonable to infer that the parties intended not to include the term in their
bargain.
3. By comparing the contract price to market prices for the same or a
very similar good: if the contract price is within the actual or plausible
range of market prices for the same or a very similar good under contracts
that included the term but not under contracts that did not include it, then it
may be reasonable to infer that the parties intended to include the term in
their bargain. Conversely, of course, if the contract price is outside the actual or plausible range of market prices for the same or a very similar good
under contracts that included the term but within the actual or plausible
range of market prices for contracts that did not include it, then it may be
reasonable to infer that the parties intended not to include the term in their
bargain.
174.
On this matter the analysis here agrees with some of the recent law and economics literature on parole evidence discussed. See supra note 156.
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MODERN BARGAIN ANALYSIS UNDER THE U.C.C.

Contrary to what one might expect, Article 2 of the U.C.C. has not
adopted the adequacy of consideration doctrine; in fact, at various points
the official comments to Article 2 appear to encourage courts to evaluate
the adequacy of the parties’ consideration. Of course, it is well known that
U.C.C. section 2-302, which is interpreted by most commentators and
courts to require an inquiry into the bargaining process, also authorizes an
inquiry into the adequacy of the consideration. Official comment 1 to
U.C.C. section 2-302 states: “[t]he basic test is whether . . . the clauses involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable.”175 But the purpose of
U.C.C. section 2-302 is not to disturb the “allocation of risks because of
superior bargaining power.”176 Official comment 1 then cites the cases discussed above in Part I.F of this Article.177 As the preceding discussion
makes clear, however, none of the cases cited in official comment 1 actually mentioned the word “unconscionability.” Indeed, they can all arguably
be construed as addressing the matter of interpreting whether some clause
or disclaimer was a part of the parties’ bargain;178 it is certainly clear that
none of them involved a question about whether an entire contract should
be voided. Given the fine line between using the unconscionability doctrine
to void a disputed contract term and simply interpreting the contract not to
include it, U.C.C. section 2-302 comes very close to authorizing an evaluation of the contract price in interpreting whether disputed terms are contractually enforceable.
There are more express directives to courts to evaluate the contract
price in interpreting bargains in the official comments to U.C.C. sections 2313 and 2-314. U.C.C. Section 2-313 governs the creation of express warranties. As most courts interpret it, an express warranty is created by a
promise or an affirmation of fact that relates to the goods and becomes part
of the basis of the bargain.179 As long as they relate to the goods, promises
or affirmations of fact will normally be presumed to be part of the bargain
unless the seller can adduce evidence sufficient to prove they were not part
of the agreement.180 Of course, sellers frequently attempt to exclude warranties with sweeping clauses that purport to disclaim all warranties, express
175.
U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (1977) (amended 2003).
176.
Id.
177.
Id.
178.
See supra Part II.F-G.
179.
U.C.C. § 2-313(1)(a) (stating “[a]ny affirmation of fact or promise made by the
seller to the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain
creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise”).
180.
U.C.C § 2-313 cmt. 3 (stating “no particular reliance on . . . statements need be
shown in order to weave them into the fabric of the agreement”).
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and implied. Official comment 4 to U.C.C. section 2-313 advises that general disclaimer clauses cannot be given literal effect.181 But it affirms that
parties are free to make their own bargains as they wish. As official comment 4 states, “[b]ut in determining what they have agreed upon good faith
is a factor and consideration should be given to the fact that the probability
is small that a real price is intended to be exchanged for a pseudoobligation.”182 This is a clear directive from the drafters that the contract
price can and should be used in deciding whether an express warranty was
made.
U.C.C. section 2-314 governs the implied warranty of merchantability.
Jurists and scholars have long debated whether this is implied as a matter of
law or whether it is implied in fact.183 At this point, the debate is academic
and probably moot. The application of U.C.C. section 2-314 can, however,
raise particular problems. One is interpreting the scope of an implied warranty of merchantability. U.C.C. section 2-314(2) defines merchantability
according to whether the goods satisfy particular criteria, such as whether
they “pass without objection in the trade under the contract description” and
“are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used.”184 Criteria
such as these, however, are closer to mud than crystal and thus fail to precisely define what it means for goods to be merchantable. How should
courts decide, then, how broadly to interpret the merchantability requirement? As official comment 7 to U.C.C. section 2-314 indicates, “[i]n cases
of doubt as to what quality is intended, the price at which a merchant closes
a contract is an excellent index of the nature and scope of his obligation
under the present section.”185 In other words, where there is any ambiguity,
courts should use the contract price to interpret the merchantability requirement.
There is arguably also some authority to use the contract price in interpreting a sales contract in the official comments to U.C.C. section 2-719.
U.C.C. section 2-719 authorizes sellers to substitute exclusive limited remedies, such as a promise to repair or replace, in place of the usual U.C.C.
remedies, which include a right to reject for any nonconformity as well as
the full panoply of damages for accepted goods that are nonconforming.186
181.
U.C.C. § 2-313(1)(a) cmt. 4 (stating “[a] clause generally disclaiming ‘all warranties express or implied’ . . . cannot be given literal effect”).
182.
Id. (emphasis added).
183.
See Smythe, supra note 84, at 222-23.
184.
U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(a)(c).
185.
U.C.C. § 2-314 cmt. 7.
186.
U.C.C. § 2-719(1)(a) (stating in part, “the agreement may provide for remedies
in addition to or in substitution for those provided in this Article and may limit or alter the
measure of damages recoverable under this Article”); U.C.C. § 2-719(1)(b) (stating “resort
to a remedy as provided is optional unless the remedy is expressly agreed to be exclusive, in
which case it is the sole remedy”)
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It also provides that if an exclusive limited remedy fails, the buyer may
resort to the remedies otherwise available under Article 2.187 Sellers often
include in their writings both an exclusive limited remedy clause and a
clause disclaiming consequential damages. If the exclusive limited remedy
fails, therefore, this can lead to a dispute about whether the clause disclaiming consequential damages is void, which would give the buyer recourse to
all the U.C.C. remedies, or whether it still applies as an additional limitation
on the buyer’s remedies intentionally included in the agreement just in case
the exclusive limited remedy fails. Official comment 1 to U.C.C. section 2719 indicates that the parties’ bargain ultimately controls whether an exclusive limited remedy fails and whether the buyer is therefore entitled to the
default remedies under Article 2. According to official comment 1, “where
an apparently fair and reasonable clause because of circumstances fails in
its purpose or operates to deprive either party of the substantial value of the
bargain, it must give way to the general remedy provisions of this Article.”188 Since the price that the buyer pays for goods may provide important
information about the value the buyer expects from the bargain, this implies
that the contract price might help to interpret whether a limited remedy has
failed and whether the buyer is entitled to the default remedies under Article 2.189
In spite of the doctrinal and theoretical taboos against evaluating the
adequacy of consideration, therefore, the official comments to Article 2
clearly indicate that, at least within certain parameters, the drafters intended
that courts should use the contract price to help interpret the scope of parties’ bargains. It should come as no great surprise, therefore, that there are
recent sales cases in which courts have evaluated the contract price in resolving interpretative disputes. Of course, there are many other cases in
which courts probably should have evaluated the contract price but did not.
The next section surveys some of the cases and suggests how the economic
analysis might have helped to improve the courts’ opinions.
A.

WARRANTIES AND DISCLAIMERS

Consider McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Thiokol Corp., a case that arose
from the well-publicized failure of the Space Shuttle’s satellite launcher in
the 1980s.190 McDonnell Douglas contracted with Thiokol to design and
187.
U.C.C. § 2-719(2) (stating, “[w]here circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail of its essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this Act”).
188.
U.C.C. § 2-719 cmt. 1.
189.
In Milgard, the Ninth Circuit took the idea a step beyond addressing whether the
seller’s limited remedy failed and looked to the contract price to help decide whether the
seller’s attempt to disclaim consequential damages also failed. See infra Part II.C.
190.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Thiokol Corp., 124 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 1997).
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manufacture the motor for the launcher, which was formally called “an upper-stage Payload Assist Module (PAM).”191 The transaction occurred in
stages, with an initial design stage followed by a qualification stage where
the motor was subject to testing, and then the manufacturing stage at which
the motor was produced for use on the Shuttle. After Thiokol’s motor had
qualified at the second stage in the process through a test-fire and review
but before the parties contracted for the actual production of the motor,
another test-fire of the motor failed. NASA and the Air Force conducted an
investigation, which concluded that no meaningful margin of safety could
be determined for the motor’s performance.192 McDonnell Douglas nonetheless contracted with Thiokol for the production of the motor. The contract terms were, of course, detailed in writing. By the terms incorporated
under the writing, Thiokol warranted that the motor would be “free from
defects in labor, material and manufacture” and that it would “be in compliance with any drawings or specifications incorporated or referenced herein.”193 There was attached to the main body of the writing a “Specification
Control Drawing” on which it was stated that “[a]ll rocket motor components shall be suitable for the purpose for which they are intended” and that
“[t]he nozzle . . . shall be capable of withstanding the thermal mechanical
loads during motor burn without any detrimental failure.’”194 Unfortunately,
upon the attempts to deploy the satellite launcher during one of the Shuttle’s missions, the motor failed.
McDonnell Douglas sued Thiokol for breach of express warranties.
McDonnell Douglas’s most interesting claim, for our purposes, was that the
statements in the Specification Control Drawings attached to the main body
of the contract created a performance warranty by which Thiokol, in effect,
insured McDonnell Douglas against the failure of the motor.195 On its face,
McDonnell Douglas’s claim was plausible: by the language in the attachment, Thiokol appeared to expressly warrant that the motor would be suitable for operating the satellite launcher and the nozzle would withstand the
heat generated by the motor. The district court, however, concluded that
there was no performance warranty in the contract.196 Upon appeal, the
Ninth Circuit affirmed.197 The Ninth Circuit noted that under California law
an affirmation of fact or promise that relates to the goods and is part of the
191.
Id. at 1174.
192.
Id. at 1175.
193.
Id. (quoting McDonnell Douglas’s Terms and Conditions Guide) (internal quotations omitted).
194.
Id. at 1178 (quoting the parties’ production contract) (internal quotations omitted).
195.
McDonnel Douglas Corp., 124 F.3d at 1178.
196.
Id. at 1179.
197.
Id.
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basis of the parties’ bargain creates an express warranty.198 Whether the
seller’s affirmations or promises become part of the basis of the bargain is a
question of fact.199 Judge Hug of the Ninth Circuit, who wrote the court’s
opinion, appeared to be persuaded in part by testimony from the McDonnell
Douglas employee who drafted the Specification Control Drawings; the
employee testified that such drawings did not normally include warranty
provisions and that he did not intend to include any in drafting them in this
case.200 Judge Hug also noted that McDonnell Douglas’s post-failure behavior was inconsistent with its claim that it believed Thiokol had made a
performance warranty.201
Most significantly for our purposes, though, Judge Hug also looked to
the contract price for evidence as to what McDonnell Douglas had bargained for. An internal memorandum written by a McDonnell Douglas employee had noted that the financial risks associated with performance warranties for the PAM program were too great to make them feasible.202 Thus,
McDonnell Douglas did not include the cost of a performance warranty in
the price of the motor; in short, it knew what it paid Thiokol for the motor,
and it knew that the price did not include a performance warranty.203 The
Ninth Circuit thus used evidence provided by one of McDonnell Douglas’s
own employees about the inadequacy of the contract price to help interpret
the contract. In part because the price was inadequate, the court interpreted
the contract not to include the warranty. Although the doctrine of unconscionability did not figure in the case, it was only a short step away: the
placement of the performance warranty in an attachment to the main body
of the contract could easily be construed as deceptive or sharp-dealing and
sufficient to meet the test for procedural abuse, and the inadequacy of the
contract price could obviously be construed to meet the test for substantive
abuse.
198.
Id. at 1176.
199.
Id.
200.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 124 F.3d at 1179.
201.
Id. After the failure, McDonnell Douglas sent Thiokol a letter stating that if an
investigation concluded the failure of the motor was due to a manufacturing defect, McDonnell Douglas would expect Thiokol to comply with the warranty provisions in the contract.
As Judge Hug observed, if McDonnell Douglas had truly believed Thiokol had also made a
performance warranty it would not have used the limiting language about defects in the
manufacture of the motor. Id.
202.
According to Judge Hug, “[i]n an internal memorandum commenting on a
NASA inquiry, a McDonnell Douglas employee stated that McDonnell Douglas ‘decided
early on in the PAM program that the financial risks associated with performance warranties
were too high considering the price of the satellite compared to the price of the PAM’ . . .
[therefore] McDonnell Douglas did not include the cost of a performance warranty in the
price of its product . . . [it] knew that it was not being charged for a performance warranty.”
Id. at 1179.
203.
Id.
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What is most striking about the Ninth Circuit’s opinion is how closely
the logic parallels the economic analysis in the preceding section of this
Article. Indeed, from an economic perspective the matter is quite clear:
given the enormous financial risks, the expected marginal costs to Thiokol
of providing a performance guarantee would probably have exceeded the
entire price that Thiokol was to receive for the motor under the contract and
McDonnell Douglas knew that. There is no way that Thiokol, or any other
rational seller, would have agreed to provide a performance guarantee that
would have cost more than the entire price it was to receive under the contract for its motor, and there is no way that McDonnell Douglas, or any
other rational buyer, could have been unaware that Thiokol did not agree to
provide a performance guarantee under those circumstances. The only way
in which the opinion could have been improved, at least from the perspective adopted here, would have been by the court more expressly stating its
economic rationale in the appropriate terminology.
Another case in which the contract price figured in the court’s opinion
was Universal Drilling Co. v. Camay Drilling Co.204 In Universal Drilling,
the buyer purchased two used oil rigs. The parties’ agreement was memorialized in a writing, which included a clause that stated the rigs were being
sold “in an ‘as-is’ condition and without any warranty of operability or fitness.”205 There was also a merger clause that stated the writing was a complete expression of the agreement and superseded any prior agreements or
understandings. When the rigs were delivered, however, the buyer discovered they were inoperable and sued, claiming that, by describing the goods
as “oil rigs,” the seller created an express warranty that the goods would be
operable as oil rigs.206 The seller countered that it contracted to deliver only
oil rigs and not operable oil rigs.207 The trial court held for the seller and the
buyer appealed to the Tenth Circuit. Judge McKay, writing for the Tenth
Circuit, acknowledged the authorities that argued against allowing a seller
to disclaim warranties created by descriptions of the goods,208 but nonetheless held for the seller. Judge McKay observed that both parties were sophisticated businesspersons before holding that the contract made no guarantee that the goods would be operable and that the court “[would] not rewrite the contract in this case.”209
What is most telling, perhaps, is that Judge McKay’s wording did not
foreclose the possibility that the Tenth Circuit might “rewrite a contract” in
some other case. Judge McKay reasoned that in the instant case the court
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Universal Drilling Co. v. Camay Drilling Co., 737 F.2d 869 (10th Cir. 1984).
Id. at 871 n.*.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 874.
Universal Drilling Co., 737 F.2d at 874 (emphasis added).
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could not think of alternate language that would memorialize the intent of
the parties to transact for the oil rigs in “as-is” condition.210 Moreover,
Judge McKay specifically noted that the holding did not leave the buyer
with an “empty bargain,” since the buyer’s own expert had appraised the
value of the oil rigs at $3,000,000 and the purchase price was only
$2,925,000.211 The contract price was not so low, in other words, that the
buyer did not earn any surplus from the transaction whatsoever. Although
this part of the opinion was merely dicta, Judge McKay clearly implied that
if the contract price had been so low that the buyer had received an empty
bargain the court might have been persuaded by the buyer’s argument that
the description of the goods created an express warranty the rigs would be
operable.
Judge McKay’s opinion comports well with basic principles of economic analysis. As noted above, the contract price is an upper bound on the
expected marginal costs that any rational seller would incur in supplying
any individual contract term and also a lower bound on the expected total
value that any buyer would be willing to receive for the good without any
(valuable) individual contract term.212 Here, Judge McKay correctly reasoned that the buyer could have rationally purchased the oil rigs, even
though he knew they were not operable, because the expected total value of
the oil rigs was still greater than the price the buyer was paying for them.
Although this analysis is not dispositive—and it was certainly not treated as
such in the Tenth Circuit’s opinion—it supports the conclusion that the
seller did not agree to deliver operable oil rigs, and the buyer did not agree
to pay for the rigs only if they were operable. If the contract price had been
higher—or if the expected total value of the oil rigs had been less—the
court may not have reached the same conclusion.
Although the case law includes occasional opinions, such as McDonnell Douglas and Universal Drilling, in which courts have used the contract
price to help interpret parties’ contracts, it probably includes even more
opinions in which courts should have considered the contract price in interpreting the parties’ contract but did not. Consider, for instance, Insurance
Co. of North America v. Automatic Sprinkler Corp.213 In Insurance Co., the
Supreme Court of Ohio held that the words “in lieu of” did not have the
same legal effect under U.C.C. section 2-316 as the words “as is,” which

210.
Id.
211.
Id.
212.
See supra Part III.B. Note also that comparing the contract price to an expert’s
market valuation of the goods is very similar to comparing the contract price to market prices. See supra Part III.D.
213.
Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Automatic Sprinkler Corp. of Am., 423 N.E. 2d 151 (Ohio
1981).
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effectively disclaim all implied warranties.214 It then considered whether an
attempt to disclaim consequential damages should fail because the disclaimer was not conspicuous.215 This was controversial because the wording in the U.C.C. does not imply that a disclaimer of consequential damages
must be conspicuous.216 Nonetheless, several courts had read a conspicuity
requirement into U.C.C. section 2-719(3), largely on the grounds that failing to do so would undermine the requirement in U.C.C. section 2-316(2)
that any exclusion of implied warranties in writing must be conspicuous.217
The Supreme Court of Ohio decided to follow those cases and quoted the
following rationale:
The limitation must be a part of the parties’ bargain
in fact. If it is contained in a printed clause which
was not conspicuous or brought to the buyer’s attention, the seller had no reasonable expectation
that the buyer understood that his remedies were
being restricted to repair and replacement. As such,
the clause cannot be said to be part of the bargain
(or agreement) of the parties.218
The statutory basis for this rationale is, at best, weak. U.C.C. section
2-316(4) authorizes disclaimers of consequential damages as long as they
comply with U.C.C. section 2-719.219 U.C.C. section 2-719(3) authorizes
any limitations or exclusions of consequential damages as long as they are
not unconscionable.220 As a general matter, contract clauses are not unconscionable simply because they are not conspicuous. Indeed, under the modern approach to unconscionability, courts typically make a substantive inquiry as well as a procedural one.221 Neither Automatic Sprinkler nor any of
the precedents it followed, however, applied the doctrine of unconscionability. Rather, they read a conspicuity requirement into U.C.C. section 2719(3) where the language did not expressly state one. To that end, they
clearly served a regulatory purpose and provided incentives to parties to
214.
Id. at 153.
215.
Id. at 153-54.
216.
U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (1977) (amended 2003) (stating “[c]onsequential damages
may be limited or excluded unless the limitation or exclusion is unconscionable.”).
217.
Ins. Co., 423 N.E. 2d at 153-154.
218.
Id.
219.
U.C.C. § 2-316(4) (stating “[r]emedies for breach of warranty can be limited in
accordance with the provisions of this Article on liquidation or limitation of damages and on
contractual modification of remedy (Sections 2-718 and 2-719)”)
220.
U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (stating “[c]onsequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the limitation or exclusion is unconscionable”).
221.
See supra Part II.D.
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future contracts to make their disclaimers of consequential damages conspicuous. But they did not really determine whether the disclaimers were
part of the parties’ intended bargains. If they had wanted to interpret the
parties’ intentions as carefully as possible, they would have done well to
consider the adequacy of the contract price. Was the contract price high
enough that a rational buyer could reasonably argue that the disclaimer was
not a part of the bargain? Or was it so low that no rational buyer should
have expected consequential damages?
There is an interesting contrast between Insurance Co. and other cases
in which consequential damages have been disclaimed by usage of trade.
Consider, for instance, Western Industries, Inc. v. Newcor Canada Ltd.222 In
Western Industries, the central issue was whether the district court erred by
excluding from evidence testimony from three expert witnesses that it was
the industry custom to disclaim consequential damages.223 The contract in
that case was for the delivery of custom welding machines; since the seller
had to design the machines before manufacturing them, it was “hybrid” in
nature—that is, partly for services and partly for goods. Judge Posner, who
wrote the opinion for the Seventh Circuit, observed that the risks of delays
and other problems with custom designed equipment were high and conjectured that it might be rational for sellers in such an industry to disclaim consequential damages and reduce the risks as a matter of custom before ultimately holding that the district court erred in excluding the evidence and
remanding the case for a new trial.224 Judge Posner did not, however, consider whether the contract price was so low that a rational seller could not
have intended to cover consequential damages. This would have been consistent with the rest of his analysis, and it might have buttressed the rationale for his holding.
In some respects, Western Industries lies at the opposite extreme from
Automatic Sprinkler. In Automatic Sprinkler, the Supreme Court of Ohio
held that there was no disclaimer of consequential damages in the contract
even though there was an express disclaimer in the parties’ writing. In
Western Industries, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that consequential damages might have been disclaimed by usage of trade even though they were
clearly not disclaimed in any writing that could have reasonably served as a
final expression of the parties’ intentions. In one respect, however, the cases
are in accord: the courts did not attempt to make any direct inquiry into the
222.
W. Indus., Inc. v. Newcor Canada Ltd., 739 F.2d 1136, 1138 (7th Cir. 1984).
223.
Id. at 1201, 1206. The seller also made an interesting “battle of the forms” argument that its writing, which excluded liability for consequential damages, should prevail
over the buyer’s, which did not. As Judge Posner observed, however, for the seller to prevail
on this argument, it would ultimately require the seller to prove that consequential damages
were excluded by usage of trade anyway. Id. at 1206.
224.
Id. at 1203.
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parties’ intentions. While they might not have been dispositive, the contract
prices might have provided additional useful evidence about whether the
parties actually intended their contracts to include a disclaimer of consequential damages.
If evidence had been presented at trial to show that the expected marginal costs to Automatic Sprinkler, of remaining liable for consequential
damages for the failure of its automatic sprinklers in a large, well-equipped
factory, would clearly have pushed its expected total costs above the price it
was receiving for the sprinklers under the contract, it might have been of
great probative value. If similar evidence had been presented at trial to
show that the expected marginal costs to Newcor, of remaining liable for
consequential damages in a hybrid contract for the delivery of welding machines that the buyer was depending on receiving in a timely fashion, would
clearly have pushed its expected total costs above the price it was receiving
for the welding machines under the contract, that might also have been of
great probative value. The lower courts might thus have been able to decide
the cases by actually interpreting the parties’ intended bargains, and that
would have provided more coherent and persuasive bases for resolving the
disputes than, in the one case, a court-made rule of contract interpretation
that is essentially regulatory in nature, and, in the other case, extrinsic evidence from industry experts about an industry custom.225
B.

RELIANCE TESTS FOR THE BASIS OF THE BARGAIN

One of the loose ends in modern sales concerns the requirements for
an express warranty. U.C.C. section 2-313(1)(a) states that a seller creates
an express warranty by making any promise or affirmation of fact that relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain.226 That
seems clear enough, but it raises the question: when does a promise or affirmation of fact become part of the basis of the bargain? How is the basis
of the bargain determined? Article 2 does not provide clear answers to those
questions. The official comments to U.C.C. section 2-313(1)(a) offer some
help. They indicate that there should be a presumption that the seller’s
promises or affirmations are part of the basis of the bargain unless the seller
can adduce evidence that disposes a jury to find otherwise.227 Courts have
225.
The argument presumes, of course, that it is better to interpret contracts in accordance with the parties’ intentions than to regulate them or interpret them using extrinsic
evidence.
226.
U.C.C. § 2-313(1)(a) (1977) (amended 2003). See supra note 174.
227.
U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 3. Comment 3 states:
In actual practice affirmations of fact made by the seller about
the goods during a bargain are regarded as part of the description of those goods; hence no particular reliance on such
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struggled to make sense of when facts have been sufficient to take a seller’s
promise out of the basis of the bargain and their holdings have been far
from uniform.228 Nonetheless, most courts apply a reliance test to determine
whether a seller’s promise or affirmation was part of the basis of the bargain.229 Thus, if the buyer did not rely on the promise, it was not part of the
bargain, and the buyer cannot seek damages if it proves false.
On the strength of the reliance test, most courts would probably hold
that a seller cannot be held liable for a promise or affirmation that the buyer
did not see, read, or hear.230 Most would probably also hold that the seller
should not be liable for promises the buyer knew were false.231 The reliance
test has also been applied, however, when the buyer may have had reason to
doubt whether the seller’s affirmations or promises were true without actually knowing that they were false. Courts have struggled with such cases. If
the buyer had serious reasons to doubt whether the affirmations or promises
were true, how could he or she have relied on them? One possibility is that
the promises may have been a kind of “insurance policy” as to the quality
of the goods.232 Under this theory, if the promises prove to be false, the
buyer has a breach of warranty claim against the seller that provides compensation for any damages. Thus, the affirmations are valuable to the buyer
even if the buyer has grounds to doubt their veracity. Of course, this is fine
in theory. The practical question is: how can courts determine whether the
seller’s promises were intended to provide such an insurance policy? Consider some cases.
In Rogath v. Siebenmann the seller promised that a painting was an authentic work of Francis Bacon.233 When the buyer attempted to resell the
painting, however, the other party reneged because of concerns about
whether the painting was authentic.234 The buyer sued the seller, claiming a
breach of express warranty because the seller’s promises about the authenticity of the painting were false. The buyer was able to prove that the seller
had been aware of challenges to the authenticity of the painting before sellstatements need be shown in order to weave them into the fabric of the agreement. Rather, any fact which is to take such affirmations, once made, out of the agreement requires clear affirmative proof.
228.
See, e.g., Royal Bus. Machs., Inc. v. Lorraine Corp., 633 F.2d 34 (7th Cir. 1980)
(holding the seller would not be liable for promises if the buyer should have known they
were false); Rogath v. Siebenmann, 129 F.3d 261 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that the seller was
liable for a promise even if buyer did not believe it).
229.
See Smythe, supra note 84, at 216-30.
230.
Id.
231.
Id.
232.
GILLETTE & WALT, supra note 95, at 256.
233.
Rogath, 129 F.3d at 263.
234.
Id.
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ing it.235 The seller defended against the claim, however, by asserting that
the buyer had also been fully aware of the challenges to the authenticity of
the painting before contracting to buy it and thus could not have relied on
the seller’s promises.236 Although the court itself did not explicitly consider
the contract price in deciding the case, it did quote from the buyer’s affidavit: “Had either Mr. Siebenmann [the seller] or Mr. Alley hinted to me that
the Painting was of questioned authenticity, it would have been a ‘red flag’
for me, as I had no desire to spend some $600,000 [ ] to purchase a painting
the authenticity of which was in dispute.”237 The court noted that the important question “[was] not whether the buyer believed in the truth of the
warranted information . . . but whether [he] believed [he] was purchasing
the [seller’s] promise [as to its truth].”238 Although the Second Circuit did
not expressly say so, it is almost axiomatic that the contract price should
bear on whether this is the case. The buyer in Rogath paid $600,000 for the
painting; if he had paid only $600, it is difficult to imagine how he could
have claimed to believe he was buying the seller’s promise as to the truth of
the promise that the painting was by Francis Bacon. Conversely, the expected total value of the painting could hardly have justified any rational
buyer in paying $600,000 for the painting if it had not been warranted to be
an authentic work of Francis Bacon. If the buyer had not believed he was
purchasing the seller’s promise as to the truth of the statement that the
painting was done by Francis Bacon, he would clearly have contracted for
an empty bargain.
Although the case suggests how and why the contract price might apply to the basis of the bargain requirement in U.C.C. section 2-313(1)(a),
Rogath is definitely not the approach the majority of courts have taken.
Consider the Royal cases. In Royal Business Machines, Inc. v. Lorraine
Corp., for instance, the Seventh Circuit held that the defendant, Royal,
would not be liable for promises or affirmations it had made to the plaintiff,
Booher, if Booher should have known the promises were false through his
prior experience with the product.239 Royal had sold a number of photocopiers to Booher in a series of separate transactions over a period of well over
a year.240 Royal made several promises about its copiers in each of the
transactions.241 Some of these promises amounted to no more than sales
puffery or otherwise failed to meet the requirements in U.C.C. section 2235.
Id.
236.
Id.
237.
Id. at 266 (internal quotations omitted).
238.
Rogath, 129 F.3d at 264 (quoting CBS Inc. v. Ziff-Davis Publ’g Co., 553
N.E.2d 997, 1000-01 (1990)).
239.
Royal Bus. Machs., Inc. v. Lorraine Corp., 633 F.2d 34, 44-45 (7th Cir. 1980).
240.
Id. at 40.
241.
Id. at 41.
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313(1)(a) for an express warranty, but others did meet the requirements, at
least in the initial transactions.242 Booher sought damages for breaches of
the promises in all of the transactions. This was problematic because Booher had acquired considerable experience with the copiers over the course
of his dealings with Royal.243 In the Seventh Circuit’s view, Booher may
have had sufficient experience with the copiers to make him doubt whether
Royal’s promises were true, and in that case, Booher could not have relied
on them.244 If so, this would have taken the promises out of the basis of the
bargain under U.C.C. section 2-313(1)(a). The Seventh Circuit, therefore,
remanded the case for a determination by the district court as to whether
Booher could have relied on Royal’s promises.245
The same logic has been followed in other cases.246 In contrast to
Rogath, what is absent from the courts’ deliberations in these cases is any
consideration of the contract price. The logic is that the seller’s promises
initially created express warranties but that as the buyer acquired experience with the goods the buyer should no longer have believed them, and
thus, they could no longer have been part of the bargain. But if the bargain
no longer included these express warranties, should the buyer have continued to pay the same price for the goods? It is possible, of course, that the
buyer might still be able to earn some surplus from the transactions even
without the express warranties, but as a general matter, if the seller offers
lower quality goods and the buyer knows it, the buyer will demand a decrease in the price. What is absent from these cases is any evidence about
what happened to the contract price over the course of the transactions. As
the discussion in Part II suggests,247 if the contract price actually fell, that
might substantiate the view that the promises were no longer part of the
bargain.248 If, however, the contract price did not change, that would tend to
indicate that both the buyer and seller still thought the bargain included all
242.
Id. at 42-44.
243.
Id. at 44.
244.
Royal Bus. Machs., Inc., 633 F.2d at 44.
245.
Id.
246.
See, e.g., Royal Typewriter Co. v. Xerographic Supplies Corp., 719 F.2d 1092,
1101 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding the buyer’s knowledge of the falsity of the seller’s promises
would negate the existence of express warranties); Janssen v. Hook, 272 N.E.2d 385, 388
(Ill. App. Ct. 1971) (stating that a buyer does not disregard any special knowledge he possesses in deciding whether to enter a bargain); Cambridge Eng’g, Inc. v. Robert Shaw Controls Co., 966 F. Supp. 1509, 1524 (E.D. Mo. 1997) (holding that the seller’s affirmations
were not part of the bargain in sales after the buyer learned about the good’s defect).
247.
See supra Part III.
248.
If the parties had previously contracted at only one price and the price fell after
the buyer acquired personal knowledge that the seller’s promises might not be true, that
would clearly take the price outside the range of prices for contracts between the buyer and
seller that included any warranties created by the promises and would suggest that the warranties were not truly part of the bargain. See supra Part III.C.
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of the seller’s promises, including any the buyer had reason to doubt by dint
of personal experience with the good.249
In cases like Royal, therefore, the contract price offers readily available evidence that is both relevant to drawing inferences about parties’ intended bargains and easy to evaluate. As a general matter, there is no reason
why the contract price could not be considered as part of a reliance test:
presumably, if a buyer’s personal experience with its seller’s goods undermines the buyer’s reliance on the seller’s promises, the buyer would, as part
of any rational bargain, either want a price reduction or an assurance in the
form of an insurance policy such as the court alluded to in Rogath, so that
the buyer could hold the seller liable in the event its promises fail. If the
contract price were not reduced, it would be more reasonable to infer that
the buyer considered the seller’s promises a kind of insurance policy than to
infer that the buyer simply agreed to accept goods of lower quality. The
application of this simple economic logic could have a significant effect on
the outcomes of the cases.250
C.

FAILURES OF LIMITED REMEDIES AND DISCLAIMERS OF
CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES

Most sophisticated manufacturers attempt to limit their liabilities for
breach of both express and implied warranties. The U.C.C. regulates
sellers’ attempts to exclude or modify express and implied warranties in
U.C.C. section 2-316.251 It also regulates their attempts to exclude or limit
damages in U.C.C. sections 2-718 and 2-719.252 Most sophisticated manufacturers are cautious about creating any express warranties, and they frequently exclude all implied warranties of merchantability and fitness. They
also commonly avail themselves of the provisions of U.C.C. section 2719(1) to offer a limited remedy to repair or replace the goods in substitu-

249.
If the price did not fall, even after the buyer acquired personal experience with
the good that might reasonably cast doubt on the veracity of the seller’s promises, that would
clearly leave it within the range of prices for contracts between the buyer and seller that
included warranties created by the promises and would suggest that the warranties were still
an intended part of the bargain. See supra Part III.C.
250.
It seems reasonable to suspect that in most of these cases the contract price did
not change, thus suggesting that the intended bargain continued to include warranties created
by the seller’s promises even after the buyer had reason to doubt whether they were true. If
so, the application of the economic logic would reverse many of the cases.
251.
U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (1977) (amended 2003) (stating in part, “to exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability or any part of it the language must mention merchantability and in case of a writing must be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any
implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a writing and conspicuous”).
252.
U.C.C. § 2-718 (regulating liquidated damages clauses); U.C.C § 2-719 (regulating clauses modifying or limiting remedies).
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tion for the remedies otherwise available in the U.C.C.253 In addition, to the
extent that they can, they typically also limit or disclaim any consequential
damages.254
This has created some confusion. Courts have struggled over the appropriate interpretation of Article 2 in cases where sellers’ attempts to limit
their buyers’ remedies fail to satisfy the regulatory provisions of U.C.C.
section 2-719. According to U.C.C. section 2-719(2), when a limited remedy fails of it its essential purpose, the buyer has recourse to all the default
remedies under Article 2.255 Of course, these include expectation damages
under U.C.C. section 2-714 as well as incidental and consequential damages under U.C.C. section 2-715. But U.C.C. section 2-719(3) also allows
sellers to limit or disclaim a buyer’s right to consequential damages.256 The
only regulations on a seller’s right to disclaim consequential damages are
that the disclaimer may not be unconscionable and that consequential damages may not be limited or disclaimed for personal injury in the case where
the buyer is a consumer.257 Since courts are reluctant to apply the doctrine
of unconscionability when invoked by a merchant,258 Article 2 in effect
places very little constraint on sellers’ ability to disclaim consequential
damages when the buyer is a merchant. Confusion arises, however, when a
seller’s limited remedies fail of their essential purpose and the seller has
also sought to disclaim consequential damages in a separate and distinct
contract clause.
Does the provision in U.C.C. section 2-719(2), which provides the
buyer with recourse to all the default remedies in Article 2, trump the additional clause purporting to disclaim consequential damages, or does the
disclaimer of consequential damages clause stand independently of whether
the limitation of remedy fails? The early cases tended to hold that the failure of the limitation of remedy nullified the seller’s attempt to disclaim
consequential damages.259 This has been called a “categorical approach.”260
253.
U.C.C. § 2-719(1)(a) (allowing a seller to offer a limited remedy in place of
those otherwise available under Article 2); U.C.C. § 2-719(1)(b) (providing that the limited
remedy will be the buyer’s only one if the parties expressly agree it is exclusive).
254.
U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (stating “[c]onsequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the limitation or exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable but
limitation of damages where the loss is commercial is not”).
255.
U.C.C. § 2-719(2) (stating “[w]here circumstances cause an exclusive or limited
remedy to fail of its essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this Act”).
256.
See supra note 254.
257.
Id.
258.
This may be in part a legacy of Arthur Leff’s two-prong test for unconscionability, since merchants are generally unlikely to be able to prove the test for procedural abuse.
See supra Part III.
259.
GILLETTE & WALT, supra note 95, at 350.
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The categorical approach does not offer a particularly convincing interpretation of the parties’ contract. If the seller’s limitation of remedy does not
fail of its essential purpose, then that alone is sufficient to deny the buyer
any consequential damages, and thus, whether the contract includes an additional clause purporting to disclaim consequential damages is irrelevant.
If the failure of the seller’s limitation of remedy clause nullifies the seller’s
attempt to disclaim consequential damages, then the additional clause purporting to disclaim consequential damages is again irrelevant. In other
words, under this early reading of the Code, an additional contract clause
purporting to disclaim consequential damages under U.C.C. section 2719(3) was irrelevant if the seller had also sought to limit the buyer’s remedy under U.C.C. section 2-719(1). Since rational parties would not normally
draft irrelevant contract terms, this is not a particularly compelling interpretation of the Code.
A more convincing interpretation, and the one that is dominant in the
recent case law,261 gives an independent effect to any contract clause that
seeks to disclaim consequential damages. Under this approach, whether the
disclaimer of consequential damages is effective is completely independent
of whether the limitation of remedy failed of its essential purpose. Thus, the
limitation of remedy is effective as long as it does not fail of its essential
purpose, and as long as it is effective, of course, the disclaimer of consequential damages clause is irrelevant. But if the limitation of remedy does
fail of its essential purpose, the disclaimer of consequential damages clause
remains effective unless a court determines that it fails for independent reasons. The clause disclaiming consequential damages thus provides an additional layer of protection for the seller and therefore at least serves an intelligible purpose. Since a contract interpretation that imputes an intelligible
purpose to contract terms seems preferable to one that does not, this seems
the more compelling approach.
U.C.C. section 2-719(3) states that consequential damages may be limited or disclaimed unless the limitation or disclaimer is unconscionable.262
If the effectiveness of a disclaimer of consequential damages is to be treated
as an independent matter, this suggests that the disclaimer should stand
unless it fails the test for unconscionability. As a general matter, however,
courts have not always simply applied the modern test for unconscionability.263 Instead, courts that have rejected the categorical approach have
sought to interpret whether a disclaimer of consequential damages clause is
260.
The Seventh Circuit termed this approach “categorical” in Smith v. Navistar
Intern. Transp. Corp., 957 F.2d 1439, 1443 (7th Cir. 1992).
261.
GILLETTE & WALT, supra note 95, at 350-51.
262.
U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (1977) (amended 2003).
263.
GILLETTE & WALT, supra note 95, at 350-51.
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still effective even though a limited remedy has failed of its essential purpose on a case-by-case basis.264 In theory, the case-by-case approach requires courts to interpret the parties’ intentions.265 In practice, however,
courts’ application of the approach appears to run the gamut from something resembling a modern unconscionability analysis to something that
more closely resembles an inquiry into the parties’ intended bargain.266 To
the extent that courts do wish to inquire into parties’ bargains, the question
they need to ask is clear: did the parties intend that the disclaimer of consequential damages provide an additional layer of protection to the seller in
the event that the limited remedy failed of its essential purpose, or was the
disclaimer merely excess verbiage associated with the exclusive limited
remedy? It is equally clear that the contract price could prove helpful in
answering such a question.
In Milgard Tempering, Inc. v. Selas Corp. of America, the Ninth Circuit did evaluate the contract price in applying the case-by-case approach.267 The buyer, Milgard, contracted for the design and delivery of a
tempering furnace in what the court described as a “carefully negotiated”
agreement.268 The seller, Selas, regarded the design of the furnace as “experimental” but agreed to deliver it for a price of $1.45 million.269 The contract also included some timeliness provisions. When Selas was unable to
comply, the parties had a dispute that they initially settled out of court, but
when Selas failed to perform within the additional period provided under
the settlement agreement, Milgard sued.270 At trial, Selas was initially
granted a summary judgment, but this was overturned on appeal.271 On remand, the trial court held not only that the limited remedy clause failed of
its essential purpose, but also that Selas’s default was fundamental enough
264.
See Smith, 957 F.2d at 1443.
265.
The Seventh Circuit, for instance, provided the following description of the
case-by-case approach:
An analysis to determine whether consequential damages are
warranted must carefully examine the individual factual situation including the type of goods involved, the parties and the
precise nature and purpose of the contract. The purpose of the
courts in contractual disputes is not to re-write contracts by ignoring parties’ intent; rather it is to interpret the existing contract as fairly as possible when all events did not occur as
planned.
AES Tech. Sys., Inc. v. Coherent Radiation, 583 F.2d 933, 941 (7th Cir. 1988) (cited in
Smith, 957 F.2d at 1443).
266.
See infra this Part.
267.
Milgard Tempering, Inc. v. Selas Corp. of Am., 902 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1990).
268.
Id. at 705.
269.
Id.
270.
Id. at 706.
271.
Id.
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to void the disclaimer of consequential damages. The court awarded Milgard over $1 million in net damages.272
Selas appealed on the grounds that the trial court erred in holding that
the limited remedy clause failed of its essential purpose and that the trial
court erred in holding that the failure of the limited remedy voided the disclaimer of consequential damages.273 Writing for the Ninth Circuit, Judge
Hall upheld the trial court on the failure of the limited remedy clause and
then addressed the question of consequential damages. According to Judge
Hall, the appropriate test under the case-by-case approach was “whether
Selas’ [sic] default caused a loss which was not part of the bargained-for
allocation of risk.”274 In fact, this was the test that the trial court had actually applied, and the Ninth Circuit therefore not surprisingly also upheld the
trial court’s decision to void Selas’s exclusion of consequential damages.275
As Judge Hall explained, “Milgard did not agree to pay $1.45 million in
order to participate in a science experiment.”276 The clear implication is that
Milgard would have received an empty bargain unless the clause in the contract disclaiming consequential damages was interpreted as excess verbiage
associated with the limited remedy clause.277
Milgard certainly uses the contract price to help interpret the parties’
contract, but the opinion is not particularly persuasive since simply stating
that the buyer did not agree to pay $1.45 million for a “science experiment”
seems conclusory. A more convincing analysis, for instance, might have
inquired into whether the expected marginal costs to Selas of covering Milgard’s consequential damages in the event that the limited remedy failed
would have been exorbitant relative to a price of $1.45 million. Would the
expected marginal costs have pushed Selas’s expected total costs over the
contract price? Milgard was awarded over one million dollars in net damages.278 The award for Milgard’s consequential damages was even larger—
over $1.1 million.279 That seems like a large amount relative to a contract

272.
Milgard, 902 F.2d at 709-10.
273.
Id. at 709.
274.
Id.
275.
Id.
276.
Id.
277.
In the terms used in the economic analysis in Part III of this Article, the expected total value of the furnace to Milgard, if the contract foreclosed a right to consequential damages when the limited remedy failed of its essential purpose, would have been so
small that Milgard would have basically received nothing in return for the price it paid of
$1.45 million.
278.
Milgard, 902 F.2d at 706.
279.
The district court calculated lost profits separately for two periods, one during
which the furnace was unable to meet any of its performance targets and the other during
which it was able to meet only some of them. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s
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price of $1.45 million, especially when the seller had characterized the design and construction of the furnace as “experimental.”280 The expected
marginal costs to Selas of remaining liable for consequential damages
would have been quite high and might have pushed Selas’s expected total
costs over the contract price. One wonders, therefore, whether the contract
price was high enough for any rational seller to have agreed to cover consequential damages, even if only in the event that the seller’s limited remedy
failed. One also wonders whether Selas had ever agreed to cover consequential damages under a similar contract with another buyer, and, if so,
how the price in that contract compared to the $1.45 million price in its
contract with Milgard. A more systematic economic analysis of Selas’s
expected marginal and total costs in comparison to the contract price might
have inclined the Ninth Circuit to reverse the trial court.
Other courts that have applied the case-by-case approach have generally not evaluated the contract price in interpreting parties’ bargains. In Smith
v. Navistar International Transportation Corp.,281 the buyer, Smith, purchased a truck for use in his long-haul trucking business.282 There was an
exclusive limited remedy clause in the contract as well as a disclaimer of
consequential damages clause.283 Smith had problems with the truck’s
brakes almost immediately after the purchase.284 Although the seller, Navistar, attempted to repair the brakes, the truck was out of service for forty-five
days and so, after revoking acceptance, Smith sought significant consequential damages.285 The district court held, as a matter of summary judgment, that Navistar had effectively disclaimed consequential damages even
though the limited remedy failed of its essential purpose. Smith appealed.286
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit applied a case-by-case analysis.287 In
writing for the Seventh Circuit, Judge Coffee affirmed the district court’s
summary judgment, noting that the buyer read the terms and conditions of
the warranty and failed to ask any questions before signing the writing.288
He also observed that there was no evidence in the record that “bargaining
power was so unequal that the disclaimer was unconscionable.”289 The Seventh Circuit did not, however, evaluate whether the contract price could
calculation of $860,497 in lost profits for Milgard over the first period and an additional
$252,608 over the second period. Id. at 710.
280.
Id. at 705.
281.
Smith v. Navistar Intern. Transp. Corp., 957 F.2d 1439, 1439 (7th Cir. 1992).
282.
Id. at 1440.
283.
Id. at 1440-41.
284.
Id. at 1441.
285.
Id.
286.
Smith, 957 F.2d at 1442.
287.
Id. at 1444.
288.
Id. at 1445.
289.
Id.
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have been adequate to interpret the parties’ bargain to allocate the risk of
consequential damages to the seller. If it had done so, that might have provided an additional basis for its decision. The buyer paid only $19,527.70
for the truck; that seems far too little for the seller to have borne the risks of
consequential damages on a commercial truck. A systematic evaluation of
the contract price in relation to the expected marginal costs to the seller of
providing consequential damages or to market prices for the same or similar
trucks under contracts with and without the seller assuming liabilities for
consequential damages might have buttressed the rationale for the court’s
holding. What the Seventh Circuit essentially did in following the case-bycase approach was little more than to apply an unconscionability test; since
Smith was unable to prove any procedural abuse, the disclaimer of consequential damages passed the test. In spite of the Seventh Circuit’s characterization of the case-by-case approach, Smith did not provide a particularly
penetrating interpretation of the parties’ intent.
The contrast between Milgard and Smith emphasizes some of the fault
lines in modern contract law. There is little practical difference between a
court voiding a contract clause on the grounds that it is unconscionable and
a court interpreting a contract not to include the clause on the grounds that
it was not part of the parties’ intended bargain. Indeed, the only real theoretical difference between a court voiding a contract clause on the grounds
that it is unconscionable and interpreting the contract not to include the
same clause on the grounds that the contract price is inadequate for it to
have been part of the parties’ intended bargain arises from the procedural
abuse prong of the modern test for unconscionability. It is far from clear
whether the drafters intended the doctrine of unconscionability in U.C.C.
section 2-302 to require a test for procedural abuse.290 It is therefore, perhaps, not surprising that the case law often appears to fall on either side of
the fine line between regulating contracts and interpreting them. In Milgard,
the Ninth Circuit decided that a disclaimer of consequential damages clause
was not effective as a matter of contract interpretation, largely, it seems, on
the grounds that the contract price was so high that the buyer would have
been left with an empty bargain otherwise. In Smith, the Seventh Circuit
upheld a disclaimer of consequential damages clause largely on the grounds
that there was no procedural abuse and it was therefore not unconscionable.
It obviously matters which side of the fault line a court decides to take.
If, in Milgard, the Ninth Circuit had applied the modern test for unconscionability instead of inquiring more broadly into the parties’ intent, the
case probably would have come out the other way. And if, in Smith, the
Seventh Circuit had made a more strenuous effort to interpret the parties’
intent instead of basically just applying the unconscionability test, that case
290.

See supra Part II.D-E.
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might have come out the other way too.291 As a general matter, courts that
apply the unconscionability test will probably tend to show more deference
to parties’ writings than those that address the issue as a matter of contract
interpretation, especially in contracts between merchants. They will also,
therefore, tend to favor the parties with the preponderance of bargaining
power, since it is usually the party with the preponderance of bargaining
power that drafts any writing. This may incline some courts to treat cases as
matters of contract interpretation rather than contract regulation. The use of
the contract price to help interpret parties’ intended bargains may help to
prevent courts from basing their interpretations on nebulous or even illfounded conceptions of the equities. But if courts are going to use contract
prices to help interpret parties’ intended bargains, they would be wise to
apply some basic principles of economic analysis in doing so.
V.

CONCLUSION

Most contract cases involve disputes about the interpretation of contracts. There is voluminous law and economics literature on contract interpretation, but much of it overlooks what to most economists should be one
of the key issues: how to use the contract price to help interpret whether
disputed terms were intended to be part of the parties’ bargains. This is no
doubt, in part, because there are legal authorities that ostensibly prohibit
courts from considering the adequacy of the contract price in deciding
whether other clauses are contractually enforceable. These authorities are
much more persuasive for some contracts, however, than for others. They
are particularly compelling in contracts for services or real estate and those
involving at least one party that can be characterized as a consumer or
household. They are not particularly persuasive, however, in contracts for
the sale of goods, especially those between two (or more) sophisticated
business parties. Indeed, in contracts for the sale of goods between sophisticated business parties, the contract price may provide costless information
that is highly relevant to interpreting the parties’ intended bargains. From
an economic perspective, therefore, courts would be remiss if they ignored
it.
It is far from clear that the U.C.C. was ever intended to preclude courts
from considering the adequacy of the contract price in interpreting sales
contracts; in fact, the official comments to the U.C.C. appear to prescribe
291.
Smith probably would have come out the same way. Milgard, however, might
very well have come out the other way. The irony therefore is that the court that considered
the contract price in interpreting the parties’ bargain may have reached the wrong outcome.
The moral is that it is not enough for courts to evaluate the adequacy of the contract price;
they must do so wisely and in accordance with basic principles of economic reasoning.
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that, in at least some contexts, courts should evaluate the adequacy of the
price in interpreting parties’ intended bargains. It should not be surprising,
therefore, that many courts have considered the adequacy of the contract
price in interpreting parties’ intended bargains under U.C.C. contracts. But
to the extent that they have, they have done so without any guidance from
economic theory. In some cases, their opinions have been less persuasive
than they might have been if they had applied some basic economic reasoning. This Article presents an economic analysis of bargains and uses it to
offer some guidance as to how the contract price can be used to interpret
whether disputed terms were an intended part of the parties’ bargain in sales
contracts between sophisticated business parties.
The analysis suggests three ways in which the contract price might be
able to help in the interpretation of contracts:
1. Through a cost-benefit inquiry: If the expected marginal costs to the
seller of providing the disputed term would have been greater than the contract price or if they would have clearly pushed the seller’s expected total
costs over the contract price, then no rational seller would have concluded
the contract with the term. Conversely, if the expected total value of the
good to the buyer without the disputed term would have been so much less
than the contract price that the buyer would clearly have been left with negative surplus, or, in other words, an empty bargain, then no rational buyer
would have concluded the contract without the term.
2. By comparing the contract price to prices in other contracts between
the same buyer and seller: If the contract price is within the actual or plausible range of prices for contracts between the buyer and seller that include
the term but is not within the actual or plausible range of prices for contracts between the buyer and seller that do not include the term, then it is
reasonable to infer that the parties intended to include the term in their bargain. Conversely, of course, if the contract price is outside the actual or
plausible range of prices for contracts between the buyer and seller that
include the term but within the actual or plausible range of prices for contracts between the buyer and seller that do not include the term, then it is
reasonable to infer that the parties intended not to include the term in their
bargain.
3. By comparing the contract price to market prices for the same or a
very similar good: If the contract price is within the actual or plausible
range of market prices for the same or a very similar good under contracts
that included the term but not under contracts that did not include it, then it
may be reasonable to infer that the parties intended to include the term in
their bargain. Conversely, of course, if the contract price is outside the actual or plausible range of market prices for the same or a very similar good
under contracts that included the term but within the actual or plausible
range of market prices for contracts that did not include it, then it may be
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reasonable to infer that the parties intended not to include the term in their
bargain.
Some courts have considered the contract price in interpreting parties’
bargains, and in some cases their opinions comport well with the economic
analysis offered in this Article. The case law is replete, however, with examples in which courts probably should have used the contract price to help
interpret parties’ bargains but did not or in which they used the contract
price but perhaps to ill effect. This Article has provided several examples of
how courts have used contract prices to help resolve interpretive disputes in
sales cases and suggested how the opinions could have been made more
persuasive through the application of the economic analysis. It has also
provided examples of cases in which courts could easily have used the contract price to good effect in helping to resolve interpretive disputes but did
not, perhaps because they labored under the misimpression that doing so
would contravene established legal authorities and sound principles of economics. The purpose has been to show how some relatively simple economic reasoning might help to improve the resolution of at least some contractual disputes.

